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ARBITRATION  PROCESS:
THE CLASS  COUNSEL  SOLUTION
David  Korn and David Rosenberg*
By mandating  that  numerous plaintiffs litigate  their common question claims sepa-
rately in individual  arbitrations  rather  than  jointly in class action arbitrations,  the
Supreme  Court in  AT&T  Mobility  LLC  v.  Concepcion  entrenched a  potent
structural  and systemic bias in favor of defendants. The bias arises from the par-
ties'  divergent  stakes  in  the  outcome  of  the  common  question  litigation in
individual  arbitrations:  each plaintiff  will only invest to maximize the value of his
or her own claim, but the defendant has an incentive to protect its entire exposure
and thus will have a  classwide incentive to invest  more in  contesting common
questions. This investment advantage enables the defendant to wield superior  liti-
gation  power against each plaintiff skewing the outcome of individual  arbitrations
in its favor and frequently rendering claims not worth filing. Concepcion  per-
petuates the bias by precluding the use of a class arbitration  solution. We propose
that courts neutralize the Concepcion  bias by  appointing class  counsel to re-
present  each  plaintiff  in  individual  arbitrations.  Without  threatening
Concepcion's holding that arbitral  efficiency  precludes class arbitration  unless
the parties  specify otherwise, the class counsel solution equalizes the parties' invest-
ment  incentives to transform individual arbitrations  into a  socially useful  legal
system for promoting the deterrence, compensation, and other public policy objec-
tives of  federal and state substantive law.
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INTRODUCTION
AT&TMobility LLC v.  Concepcion' caps a series of recent Supreme
Court  decisions  that  together  read  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act
(FAA) 2  to require  resolution  of all common  question  litigations  in
individual arbitrations 3 unless class arbitration is expressly agreed to
1.  131  S.  Ct. 1740  (2011).
2.  9 U.S.C.  § 2  (2006).
3.  "Common  question  litigations"  involve  multiple  plaintiffs  suing a common  defen-
dant-business  or government-on causes  of action for damages  or equitable  remedies that
present the same or similar legal and factual  claims or defenses. For simplicity, references  to
"plaintiff" and  "defendant" generically  include the  principal  adversarial  parties  to suits  in
court and  arbitration.  In some  types  of common  question  litigations,  such  as  copyright  in-
fringement  and  recent  mortgage-backed  securities  suits,  the  relationship  of the  parties  is
reversed, with a common plaintiff suing multiple defendants.  See, e.g.,  Assaf Hamdani & Alon
Klement,  The  Class Defense, 93 CAUF.  L.  REv.  685  (2005);  Peter J.  Henning,  U.S.  'Takes Hard
Line  in  Suits  Over Bad Mortgages, N.Y.  TiMEs  DEALBOOK  (Sept.  6,  2011,  3:46  PM),  http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/u-s-takes-hard-line-in-suits-over-bad-mortgages/  ("The
Federal  Housing Finance  Agency, which  oversees the mortgage  giants Fannie  Mae and Fred-
die  Mac,  is  suing  17  leading  banks  that sold  them  nearly  $200  billion  worth  of subprime
mortgage-backed  securities  that fell sharply in value when  the housing market collapsed.").The Class Counsel Solution
by the  parties-realistically,  by defendants-or  mandated  by Con-
gress.4 Whether  intended  or not,  Concepcion's default  rule  against
class  arbitration  creates  a  potent  structural  and  systemic  bias  in
favor  of defendants. 5 In biasing the  arbitration process,  Concepcion
subverts deterrence,  compensation,  and  other public policy  objec-
tives of federal and  state substantive law.
In  this Article,  we  explain why  this  bias  can  arise under  Concep-
cion's mandate for individual arbitration  trials of common  question
claims  but  does not  arise when  such  claims  are  resolved  by  class
arbitration, the  arbitration  version  of the judicial  class action  that
contemplates  classwide  trial and  res judicata effects. We  show, how-
ever, that the bias can be eliminated readily without running afoul
of Concepcion's rejection  of non-contracted  class arbitration. 6 Under
our  proposal,  instead  of imposing  class  arbitration,  courts  would
rectify the pro-defendant  bias  by proceeding  under standard  class
action rules to appoint class counsel to represent class members  in-
dividually  in their respective  arbitrations.
Our proposal  may seem  paradoxical,  as  it assigns  class  counsel
the  role  of representing individual  plaintiffs  in individual  arbitra-
tion  trials  rather  than  representing  the  class  collectively  in  a
classwide  trial. However,  once we  clarify  the nature  of the  pro-de-
fendant  bias,  it  will  be  evident  that  our  "class  counsel  solution"
eliminates bias completely, efficiently, and-consistent with  Concep-
cion-without  requiring  class  arbitrations  or  otherwise
compromising the purposes and functioning of the individual arbi-
tration process.
Essentially, a structural bias arises when common question claims
are  resolved  through  individual  arbitrations:  the  stakes  of the  de-
fendant and each plaintiff starkly  differ, as do their corresponding
incentives  to invest in making their cases on common questions . A
4.  See  Concepcion,  131  S.  Ct. at  1751  ("[C]lass  arbitration,  to the extent it is  manufac-
tured  by [state law]  rather than consensual,  is inconsistent with the FAA."); Stolt-Nielsen  S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds  Int'l  Corp.,  130  S.  Ct. 1758,  1775  (2010)  ("[A]  party  may not be compelled
under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding
that the party agreed to do so."); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,  473
U.S. 614, 628  (1985)  ("Having made the bargain  to arbitrate  [individually],  the party should
be held  to it unless Congress  itself has evinced an intention  to preclude  a waiver of  judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue.").  The FAA thus effectively preempts all lawmaking
authorities except Congress-including state legislatures as well as state and federal courts-
from  modifying  such  basic  procedures  of  arbitration  as  the  mandate  for  individual
arbitrations.
5.  See  infra Part  I.A.  We  discuss  the  Concepcion Court's  motivations  in  concluding
remarks.
6.  See infra Part  III.
7.  The pro-defendant bias applies to all  common question litigations resolved in court
by separate  actions or in arbitration by individual  arbitrations. Our argument  derives from
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common  defendant  always  has the  greater  stake  (indeed, a  class-
wide  stake)  and  consequently  the  greater  incentive  (usually  by
many orders of magnitude)  to spend than the plaintiff.  In contrast
to the plaintiffs  stake and related investment incentive, which  are
defined and limited by the expected recovery  on his or her particu-
lar  claim,  the  defendant  litigates  from  an  aggregate-classwide-
perspective.  Even  though  its liability  will  be determined  claim-by-
claim,  the  defendant  invests  to  develop  the  common  question
defense that minimizes its classwide exposure to the costs of liability
and litigation in the  aggregate,  not for any particular claim.,  On the
realistic assumption  that the amount spent on lawyers,  experts, dis-
covery, and other litigation needs  correlates with their quality, and
hence with  the odds of winning  at trial,9 the defendant's  resulting
superior litigation  power will  skew  outcomes in its  favor classwide,
across  all claims.
Exploiting  such  scale  efficiencies  to  optimally  invest  on a  class-
wide  basis  against  an  adversary  limited  to  investing  based  on  a
fractional,  typically minute stake,  the defendant can deploy a com-
mon question  defense  in any  given individual  arbitration  that will
likely  overwhelm  the  plaintiffs  case.  Knowing  that the  defendant
will spend more and win more often, potential  plaintiffs may never
bring claims.  Thus, for example,  a defendant facing  one hundred
similar arbitration  claims  each for $1,000  would,  all else  equal, ra-
tionally  spend  up  to  $100,000  in  developing  its best  case  on  the
common questions to deploy against the plaintiff in any given indi-
vidual  arbitration. 1 0  In  response,  each  plaintiff  would  rationally
analysis of the problem and the collective action solution in the judicial context introduced
to the literature  in David  Rosenberg,  The  Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A  "Public
Law"  Vision of the  Tort System,  97 HARv.  L.  REv.  849  (1984)  [hereinafter  Rosenberg,  Causal
Connection], subsequently  developed  in  David  Rosenberg,  Mandatory-Litigation Class Action:
The Only  Option for Mass Tort  Cases, 115  HARv.  L.  REV.  831  (2002)  [hereinafter  Rosenberg,
Mandatory-Litigation  Class Action],  and formally examined with important extensions in David
Rosenberg  & Kathryn  E.  Spier,  On Structural Bias in the Litigation of Common  Question Claims
(Harvard  Pub.  Law Working  Paper  No.  11-28,  2011),  available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1950196.  For recent elaboration  and application  of the  struc-
tural  bias  analysis  in  the  context  of judicial  class  actions,  see  Sergio J.  Campos,  Proof of
Classwide Injury, 37  BROOK. J.  INT'L  L. 751  (2012).  We also  draw upon  the arguments  and
proposals  for multiple  class  action  trials  in Bruce  Hay  & David  Rosenberg,  "Sweetheart" and
"Blackmail"  Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy,  75  NOTRE  DAME  L. Rav.  1377,  1378
nn.4-6  (2000).  This Article contributes  to the literature  by applying the analysis to the arbi-
tration context and advancing  the class counsel solution to eliminate  pro-defendant bias in a
manner consistent with  Concepcion's mandate  for individual  arbitrations.
8.  See infra Part I.A.
9.  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and  Judicial  Administra-
tion, 2J.  LEGAL  STUD.  399, 430-31  (1973).
10.  For the sake of simple illustration, we also assume that the defendant spends only to
litigate the common  question.
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spend up to the $100  at stake  in the particular  case. Spending one
hundred times more than each plaintiff in an individual arbitration
likely will  allow  the  common  defendant  to  wield  a  decisive  upper
hand at trial  (arbitral or otherwise),  which  in  many cases will  pre-
clude  plaintiffs from  filing claims  in  the first place.  In  Concepcion,
AT&T had incentive to make a classwide  investment in its common
question  defense  against  thousands  of claims,  each worth roughly
$30.11
This  pro-defendant  bias  is  endemic  to  the  process  of resolving
common  question claims  in individual arbitrations.  Its existence  is
not a function  of the  defendant's  wealth,  the  business  or govern-
mental  activity  involved,  or  the  size,  type,  or  complexity  of  the
litigation-though  any  combination  of  these  factors  may  com-
pound  or  mitigate  the  problem.  Indeed,  the  defendant's
investment advantage  in individual arbitrations pervades  the entire
spectrum  of  common  question  litigations,  including  consumer,
franchise, and other contractual disputes; personal-injury  claims for
non-economic  damages;  and  controversies  implicating  important
public  policies,  such  as  those  presented  in  constitutional,  civil
rights,  employment discrimination,  copyright,  securities,  and anti-
trust  cases.  However,  as  indicated  above,  the  number  of
independently prosecuted  individual arbitrations  is a highly signifi-
cant variable;  the more plaintiffs  that must proceed independently
by  individual  arbitrations,  the  more  the  process  becomes  biased
against  them. The  bias  decreases  as  the number  of plaintiffs  pro-
ceeding  alone  in  individual  arbitrations  falls  and  vanishes  when
plaintiffs proceed as  one by class arbitration.
The  key  to addressing  Concepcion's bias  is  correcting  the  stake-
driven  asymmetry  in  investment  incentives.  Class  arbitrations  do
just that by vesting class  counsel with  the same classwide  stake  and
corresponding  scale  efficiencies  that  the  defendant  naturally  ex-
ploits in making its classwide  investment on common questions. But
classwide trial itself does not cause or cure the bias. Concepcion's bias
occurs  in  the  individual  arbitration  process because  of the lack of
symmetry  between  the defendant's  classwide  stake and  each plain-
tiffs  recovery-specific  stake  in  the  outcome  of  the  common
question litigation.  Class arbitration  is sufficient, but not necessary,
to solve  the problem. Indeed, all of the heavy lifting in correcting
the asymmetry  in incentives  in class  arbitrations  is done  simply by
11.  Although AT&T's arbitration contract obligated it  to reimburse  each plaintiff for the
cost of the individual arbitration, including a  reasonable  attorney fee for litigating the $30
claim, the plaintiff had little chance of succeeding against the defendant's classwide financed
common  question  defense. For further discussion of this point, see  infra note 24.
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the appointment  of class  counsel with  a  classwide  stake  (normally
the court-awarded attorney's fee) contingent on the outcome of the
common  question  litigation  across  all  claims.  It matters  not at all
whether  those claims  are  tried collectively or individually.
Our proposal for appointing class counsel to represent plaintiffs
in individual arbitrations  completely solves the structural bias prob-
lem by vesting the attorney with a classwide stake in the outcome of
the  common question  litigation equivalent  in  scope  to  that of the
defendant's.  Proceeding  as  the  "owner" of the  classwide  recovery
stake in the outcome of the common question  claims, just as defen-
dant  proceeds  as  "owner"  of  the  classwide  defense  stake,  class
counsel will be  motivated to optimally invest on a classwide  basis to
maximize the return  (net of litigation cost) from the recovery on all
claims.' 2 In the above example, all else  equal, class counsel can ex-
ploit scale  efficiencies  as fully and cost-effectively  as the  defendant
and  invest  up  to  $100,000  in  making  plaintiffs'  best  case  on  the
common  questions and countering the defendant's common  ques-
tion defense. 13 By providing both sides-defendant and plaintiffs-
a classwide stake in the outcome of the common question litigation
and a corresponding  incentive  to invest in making their respective
best cases,  the class counsel solution  levels  the playing field, trans-
forming the arbitration process into  a socially beneficial system  for
promoting  (instead of obstructing) the social goals and effective en-
forcement of substantive  law.
The class counsel solution achieves  these  results without adding
cost to arbitral and judicial processes or conflicting with  Concepcion.
The proposal entails no classwide arbitration trial, thereby avoiding
the  potential  for  "in  terrorem" settlement  and  other  class  action
12.  See infra Part I.B.
13.  Our  example  should  not  be  taken  to  suggest  that vesting  plaintiffs  with  a  stake
equivalent in scope to defendant's in  the classwide  outcome of the common question  litiga-
tion will lead the parties actually to spend the same amount. Indeed, their expenditures  may
well differ under the circumstances  of a particular common  question litigation, if, for exam-
ple, one party  must pay  more  than  the other for  legal services,  if plaintiffs have  first-party
insurance  to  cover their losses and mitigate their risk-bearing  costs, or if the defendant fears
damage to  its reputation in the marketplace. Differences in the parties'  incentives and invest-
ments  are  virtually  inevitable  in  reality  when  those  decisions  reflect,  as  they  typically will,
forecasts  of the  opposing party's  spending. The amount invested  on common  questions  in
any litigation depends on  the costs and  benefits of spending more or less on the margin for
discovery,  experts,  lawyers,  and other variable-cost  factors  (on which  expenditures  can  be
scaled  up or down,  in  theory, continuously, as opposed  to fixed-cost inputs such as fees  for
filing, arbitrators,  and stenographic  services).  That determination  turns on  a strategic esti-
mate of how much the other side will spend and what effect  that expenditure  is expected  to
have  on the  outcome of the common  question  litigation.  In  equilibrium,  the parties likely
will spend  markedly  different amounts  according  to their  differing,  interactive  investment
options  and choices,  but Concepcion's bias  puts a systematic  thumb on  the scale  in favor of
common  defendants.
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burdens on the arbitration  process.14 Because it only contemplates
class counsel representing  individual plaintiffs in individual arbitra-
tions, and relatedly  operates subject  to  each plaintiff's prerogative
to refuse authorization for filing his or her arbitration  claim as well
as to opt-out of the class,  the proposal also  avoids  the complexities
of certifying a class  action  for classwide  trial. Although  the normal
Rule  2315  (or analog state)  criteria for certifying class  action would
apply, it is likely that the sole significant issue for the court to deter-
mine  would  be  the  relative  adequacy  of  candidates  vying  for
appointment  as class counsel-nothing  new in  class action.' 6
Courts  can implement  the  class  counsel  solution  in full  accord
with  Concepcion. The  Court ruled  out judicial or state  legislative  at-
tempts  to  alter,  for  policy  reasons,  the  arbitration  process  by
conditioning enforcement of arbitration agreements on their incor-
poration of a corrective, such as class arbitration, that is antithetical
to the raison d'etre of the process:  its procedural  efficiencies. Pursu-
ant  to  our  proposal,  courts  would  enforce  all  valid  arbitration
agreements  directly  after  determining  whether  to  certify  a  Rule
23(b)(3)  class  for  the  very  limited  purpose  of  appointing  class
counsel to represent common question  plaintiffs in their individual
arbitrations. Alternatively, courts would declare  no-class arbitration
clauses invalid for biasing the arbitration process and would condi-
tion  enforcement  on  the  defendant  agreeing  to  the  judge's
consideration  of such limited class action certification-a  corrective
that actually  promotes  the  efficiency  of the  individual  arbitration
process.
Part  I  elaborates  the  causes  and  consequences  of  Concepcion's
pro-defendant  biasing of the  individual  arbitration  process before
explaining  how the class counsel  solution eliminates  the problem.
Part II describes  in  greater detail  how our proposal  operates  and
then evaluates its social benefits and  costs, including  potential bur-
dens  on  the  arbitration  and  judicial  processes,  as  well  as  its
comparative  effectiveness  relative  to relying on the market  to solve
14.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,  131  S.  Ct. 1740,  1752 (2011).
15.  FED.  R. Crv. P. 23. There is a strong argument for treating the mandatory  class action
provisions  of Rule 23(b) (1) and  (2)  as  express congressional  exemptions from  the  FAA  de-
fault  rule  barring  class  arbitration  and  mandating  individual  arbitrations  recognized  in
Concepcion. For this reason, we focus analysis on the provisions for judicially assisted voluntary
classwide joinder under Rule  23(b)(3).
16.  See  FED.  R.  Crv.  P.  23(a)(4).  Far from  a  sidebar, the responsibility  to appoint  ade-
quate  counsel  is  central  to  the  judicial  management  of modern  litigation  not only  in
multidistrict litigation  (MDL)  and other aggregate  litigation contexts, but also  in bankruptcy,
administration  of decedent estates, and a host of other areas  in which courts  appoint attor-
neys  (or other fiduciaries)  to represent  the  interests of individuals  who  lack  the means or
practical  ability  to personally hire and oversee  their own  legal counsel.
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the  pro-defendant  bias  through  voluntary  claim joinder.  Part  III
considers  the compatibility of our proposal  with  the FAA  as inter-
preted by Concepcion and with  Rule  23 certification  of judicial  class
actions. In concluding remarks, we briefly note that the class coun-
sel  solution  alone  cannot  correct  troubling  concerns  raised  by
Concepcion that range far  beyond  its pro-defendant  biasing of the
arbitration  process.
I.  CONCEPCION'S BIAS  PROBLEM,  AND  How TO  SOLVE  IT
We  begin  this  Part by  elaborating  on  the  nature and  effects  of
Concepcion's pro-defendant biasing of the individual arbitration pro-
cess,  extending our analysis  to  consider parties  making marginal,
interactive  investment decisions  in settlement  as well  as  trial  con-
texts. Following  that discussion, we  explain  how and why the  class
counsel solution works  to eliminate  the  Concepcion bias without of-
fending  its  individual  arbitration  mandate.  We  defer  to  Part  II  a
description  of the  mechanics  by  which  class  counsel  will  be  ap-
pointed  to  represent arbitration  class  members in  their individual
arbitrations and an evaluation of our proposal's  social benefits and
costs.
A.  Concepcion's Pro-Defendant  Bias
Concepcion's pro-defendant  biasing of the  individual  arbitration
process  reflects  the  basic  axiom  of litigation  economics  (true  for
any rationally financed venture): the litigant with more at stake has
an  incentive  to  spend  more  in  making  its  case. 17 When  multiple
claims against a  common defendant turn on common  questions  of
law or fact,  Concepcion's mandate for individual  arbitrations  creates
a decisive  asymmetry in stakes  and corresponding  incentives  to  in-
vest in contesting common  questions. The defendant  literally has a
classwide stake in the outcome of such litigation across all claims-
more  accurately,  against  all  claims  it  expects  to face-while  each
plaintiff's stake  is limited  to his or her potential recovery  from  the
particular  claim.  This  disparity-increasing  with  each  additional
claim prosecuted independently-steeply  slants the individual arbi-
tration process, distorting both trial and settlement outcomes in the
17.  See Posner, supra note 9,  at 418-19.
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defendant's favor and undermining  the economic viability of meri-
torious  claims  even  to  the  point  of  forcing  their  forfeiture  by
plaintiffs.
1. How  Concepcion Biases  Litigation  Strategies  and
Arbitration  Outcomes
We  use a richer numerical example  to illustrate the operation  of
the  Concepcion bias  in a  realistic context, with the  parties  choosing
how much  to spend against each  other on a marginal  and strategi-
cally  interactive  basis.  Thus, each party  decides  whether  to  spend
more  or less  in litigating the  common questions  by assessing costs
and benefits of the investment, not in absolute  terms and isolation,
but rather incrementally, as a function of the amount and impact of
the other party's likely investment. This enables us  to spotlight our
central  point:  the  cause  and  driver  of the  Concepcion bias  is  the
asymmetry  between  the defendant's  classwide  stake  and the  plain-
tiff's  personal,  recovery-specific  stake,  which  creates  divergent
incentives  to invest and skews the resolution  of the common  ques-
tions in  an individual  arbitration.
Consider  a  case  involving  ten  common-question  arbitration
claims against a bank, each seeking $10,000  in damages for alleged
predatory mortgage-lending practices.'8  Assume that the defendant
bank and  the  plaintiff borrower  in  an  individual  arbitration  each
have  the option  of spending either $5,000  or $12,000  on common
question  litigation expenses  (i.e.,  lawyers,  discovery,  experts,  etc.).
If  the  parties  each  spend  the  same  amount,  the  plaintiff's
probability of winning at trial would be  60 and 70 percent, respec-
tively. 1 9 If one party invests  $5,000  while the  other invests $12,000,
assume the  party spending  the greater amount will  have  a 90  per-
cent chance  of winning at trial on the common  questions.
Suppose first that only one borrower will file a claim  against the
bank. Under these  circumstances,  both  parties will  each  invest the
18.  Cf,  e.g., Watkins v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.,  631  F. Supp. 2d 776, 779 (S.D. W. Va.
2008)  (involving  putative class  claims based  on predatory  lending practices brought  by bor-
rower who defaulted on her home mortgage).  We consider a case involving ten claims for the
sake  of simplicity;  it is  easy  to imagine how  the bias's effect  compounds in  the  typical case,
which  involves far more  than  the one  hundred  class  member claims  required for  diversity
jurisdiction  under the Class Action Fairness Act.  See 28  U.S.C. §  1332(d)(5) (B)  (2006).
19.  To simplify the example, we assume only two investment options. In real world litiga-
tion,  the  parties'  options  approach  a continuum.  See  Rosenberg,  Mandatory-Litigation Class
Action, supra note  7, at 848 & n.40.
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same amount, $5,000, with the result that the defendant would  ex-
pect to incur $11,000  in total costs  of liability and litigation20 while
the plaintiff would expect  to recover $1,000  net of litigation cost.
21
Neither party will  have  an  incentive  to invest  $7,000  more  on  the
margin  because spending  that amount would  not improve  the  ex-
pected return by more than the additional  investment regardless  of
whether the marginal  expenditure  is  made by both or only one  of
them.
2 2
But when the bank faces not one but ten claims, it is in a position
to  exploit  scale  efficiencies  for a  classwide  investment  advantage.
The bank now has a classwide stake of $100,000  in the success of its
common  question defense  and would find  it economically  rational
to spend $12,000  against plaintiffs $5,000.  Each plaintiffs  individ-
ual incentives are the same as those shown above, so no plaintiff has
an  incentive  to  make  the marginally  higher  investment.  Straight-
away,  by  investing  an additional  $7,000  on the  margin,  the  bank
reduces  its  total  expected  costs  of liability  and  litigation  at  trial
across all claims by $43,000.23
20.  $11,000  = (60%  x $10,000)  + $5,000.
21.  $1,000  = (60%  x $10,000)  - $5,000.
22.  If the parties each make the higher investment, then the additional  $7,000  will result
in a $1,000  change in the expected outcome. If one party anticipates that the other will not
match the added $7,000 investment, then the expenditure of $7,000 will result in a change of
$3,000  in  outcome.
23.  $43,000 = [(60% x $100,000)  + $5,000]  - [(10%  x $100,000)  + $12,000].  Because  the
defendant  spreads  the  increased  marginal  investment  equally  (in  this  example)  across  all
claims,  the additional  expenditure  reduces  its  effective  total  expected  costs  in  litigating a
particular  claim  from  $6,500  [(60%  x  $10,000)  + $500]  to  $2,200  [(10%  x  $10,000)  +
$1,200],  saving $4,300  per claim. The  ability  to spread costs  is an  elemental  feature  of the
defendant's  investment advantage,  and it plays  a pivotal role  in  Concepcion's pro-defendant
biasing of individual arbitration  settlements. As we show later, settlement  biasing occurs be-
cause the defendant can spread  costs across all claims, whereas each plaintiff bears his or her
costs  alone and  fully.  It  should  be  noted  that  the defendant's  classwide  stake and  related
investment incentive  advantage will not necessarily lead  to lower  per-claim  costs as an abso-
lute matter. Indeed,  the defendant is likely to end  up spending more  on each  claim than it
would spend on a claim if it were the  only one filed.  The essence of defendant's investment
advantage  is  the productivity of the investment in increasing  the defendant's  chances  of suc-
ceeding  at  trial  on  the common  questions. The  defendant's  marginal  choice  may involve
increasing its  per-claim  and overall  cost, yet it  will  have  an economically  rational  motive to
spend the additional  amount if it expects  to gain  even more on the margin at trial. Thus, the
defendant's  advantage  stems  from  the  one-sided  opportunity  to increase  the  quality of its
common  question  case on  a  classwide  basis and  hence  to  increase  its chance  of winning
against  each  plaintiff in an individual  arbitration.The Class Counsel Solution
2.  Defendants  Exploit  Bias to Bar Filing of Arbitration  Claims
A defendant can exploit the Concepcion  bias notjust to overwhelm
each plaintiffs case at trial, but to totally destroy the potential value
of his or her claim so as to render it not worth  filing. Thus in  the
example, the defendant bank gains an even greater benefit from its
superior investment incentive:  its credible threat to make a devastat-
ing  marginal  investment  against  the  plaintiff that should  reduce
liability exposure  to zero without costing a dime.  Because it is eco-
nomically  rational for  the defendant  to spend  $7,000 more on the
margin,  the plaintiff should anticipate  this investment  and the  re-
sulting reduction  in  his or her probability  of winning at trial to 10
percent. With an expected recovery of only $1,000,  the plaintiff will
not spend even  $5,000  on common question litigation and instead
will  forfeit  the  claim.  By  confronting  potential  plaintiffs  with  the
prospects  of going  into  the  red from  prosecuting  their  claims  in
individual arbitrations,  the defendant can entirely escape civil liabil-
ity  under  governing  state  and  federal  laws,  regardless  of  the
magnitude of its wrongdoing. As a result, the pro-defendant bias in
Concepcion deters a wide array of otherwise viable, socially beneficial
claims.
Defendants  can wield their investment advantage  to  achieve  the
same  preclusive  result  even  more  easily  if the  plaintiff bears  the
fixed costs of the individual arbitration, which can include paying a
filing fee for the  claim and rent on the room in which  the arbitra-
tion  takes  place. These  costs  can extinguish  claims  in many  cases
involving  losses  of small to modest amounts.
2 4 But when added to
24.  See Posner,  supra note  9,  at 437-40.  The  defendant might  be  required  under  Su-
preme Court rulings like Green Tree Financial  Crp.-Alabama  v. Randolph,  531  U.S. 79 (2000),  to
cover  most, and  possibly all, of the plaintiff's  fixed costs, win  or lose.  See id. at 90-91.  Many
mistakenly believe that class action is primarily needed only to overcome  the fixed-cost obsta-
cle  to filing suit and thus would  be unnecessary if the plaintiff were relieved of that burden,
say by the defendant or taxpayers  bearing  the cost.  See, e.g.,  RICHARD A.  POSNER,  ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS  OF  LAW 785  (8th ed. 2011). Were this approach  taken, however, the Concepcion bias
would still  remain  in full force  and thus  be capable  of destroying the viability of any claim
whose chance  of success could be  affected by the defendant's variable-cost  investment. Only
the  rare  claim  that  is virtually certain  to  succeed upon  its mere filing  can escape  the  event
horizon  of the Concepcion bias.  See generally Rosenberg & Spier, supra note  7  (demonstrating
that structural  bias operates in all common question  cases involving  variable costs and hence
that there is virtually universal  need for class action to eliminate defendants'  resulting class-
wide  investment  advantage  by  vesting  class  counsel  with  equivalent  classwide  stake  and
corresponding  investment incentive).
It  is  noteworthy  that in  Concepcion the  defendant apparently  agreed  to  reimburse  the
plaintiff's reasonable  attorney's  fees, win  or  lose  (except  for frivolous or otherwise  improp-
erly  motivated claims).  See Laster  v. AT&T  Mobility LLC,  584 F.3d  849, 856  n.10  (9th  Cir.
2009),  rev'd sub noma.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131  S. Ct. 1740  (2011)  (referencing
the revised arbitration agreement providing that the defendant would cover all costs and fees
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the  plaintiff's variable costs, fixed costs mean defendants  need not
threaten to spend as much to turn an otherwise economically viable
claim  into  a  nullity.  Modifying  slightly  the  above  example  of ten
claims for $10,000  each,  suppose  the plaintiff bears $1,500  in fixed
costs.  In  this  case,  anticipating  that  the  plaintiff would  invest  no
more than $5,000, the defendant need only spend $5,000 instead of
$12,000  to preempt filing  of the  claim.25 By  driving the  plaintiffs
expected  recovery  below  the  fixed  cost barrier  into  "negative  ex-
pected  value"  territory,  the  defendant  can  eliminate  its  entire
liability exposure.
Regardless  of the incidence  of fixed costs, the background obsta-
cle  to  filing  claims  remains  the  Concepcion bias.  Observers  should
not be fooled by the cosmetic  beneficence  of an arbitration  agree-
ment  that  imposes  fixed  costs  on  the  defendant.  Beneath  an
appearance  of  evenhandedness  perpetuated  by  the  Supreme
Court 26 remains  the reality that disproportionate investment incen-
tives  cull  a  large  proportion  of  claims,  saving  defendants  from
paying anything  in costs or compensation.
3.  The Bias  Distorts  Settlement Values
Even  when  individual  plaintiffs  retain  an  incentive  to  pursue
their  claims,  the  bias operates  to  reduce  the  amount a defendant
will pay in settlement by enabling the defendant, but not the plain-
tiff, to  make  a  classwide  common  question  investment  that  both
skews the chance of winning at trial in its favor and spreads the cost
of that investment across  all claims. Again,  by modifying  the mort-
gage  claim  example,  we  can  demonstrate  this  effect.  Now assume
that each claim is worth  $60,000; that the higher common question
investment  is  $25,000;  that if  both  parties  each  spend  $5,000  or
of arbitration, except if the plaintiff's claim  was frivolous or otherwise improperly motivated).
Obviously, if by committing to  pay each plaintiff's attorney's fees the defendant was agreeing
as a practical matter to settle for the face value of the underlying claim, then there would not
be any  Concepcion bias because there  would not be  any dispute to arbitrate.  However,  when
the defendant disputes  a common question  claim, its payment of a plaintiffs attorney's fees,
calculated as  the reasonable  expenditure  for prosecuting  an  individual $30-type  arbitration
claim and surely not for making the classwide investment needed  to overcome  the  Concepcion
bias, would  do  little  if anything to mitigate  its enormous,  classwide  investment advantage.
25.  Even  though  the net expected recovery  is  $1,000  if both parties invest $5,000,  the
plaintiff will not file the claim because  the anticipated  payoff is insufficient to overcome  the
$1,500  fixed-cost barrier. -$500 = [(60% x $10,000)  - $5,000]  - $1,500.
26.  Compare Green Tree, 531  U.S. at 90  ("[T]he record  does not show  that Randolph  will
bear such  [large]  costs  if she  goes  to arbitration."),  with id. at 95  (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("[Tihere  is  no reliable  indication  in  this record  that Randolph's  claim  will be  arbitrated
under any consumer-protective  fee  arrangement.").
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$25,000,  the plaintiffs'  probability of success  at trial will  be 60 and
70 percent, respectively;  and that if one party invests more than the
other, the party making  the higher investment will have an 80 per-
cent  chance  of  succeeding  at  trial  on  the  common  questions.
Because spending $20,000 more on the margin increases the margi-
nal expected recovery by only $6,000,27  each plaintiff will invest no
more than $5,000. Anticipating that each plaintiff will stick with the
$5,000  investment, the  defendant bank will  be  motivated to  make
the  marginal  investment  of $20,000  to  reduce  its  total  expected
costs  of liability  and  litigation  across  all  claims  from  $365,000  to
$135,000,  thereby reaping considerable  savings of $220,000.28
To show the settlement effects of the Concepcion bias in the modi-
fied  example,  we  assume  that  both  parties'  estimates  of  the
expected  recovery  and  powers  of bargaining  are  equivalent.  As
such,  settlement  should  track  the  expected  trial  outcome,  which
would  be $36,000  if the  parties invest  the  same amount  ($5,000),
and $20,000  if the defendant bank invests  $25,000 while  the plain-
tiff sticks  with  $5,000. Primarily motivated  to  avoid  trial  costs,  the
parties in each individual  case  will consider a settlement range  de-
fined by the sum of the defendant's total expected  costs of liability
and litigation and the plaintiffs net expected recovery.29 With bal-
anced  bargaining  power, 3 0  it  is  likely  the  parties  will  thus  reach
settlement  around  the  mean  of  those  expected  amounts.  If  the
bank faced only one claim and both parties spent $5,000 each for a
60 percent probability of plaintiff success at trial, then that plaintiff
should expect  to  receive  $36,000  in  settlement.31 However,  facing
ten  claims,  the bank  is  motivated  not only  to make  a  classwide  in-
vestment  of $25,000  against  each  plaintiffs  investment  of $5,000,
but also  to spread it across  all claims.  Lacking equivalent opportu-
nity to spread the common question investment, the plaintiff in any
given  individual  arbitration  should  expect  to  receive  a  mere
$10,750  in settlement.
32
27.  $6,000  = (70%  x  $60,000)  - (60%  x $60,000).
28.  $220,000  = [(60% x $60,000 x 10) + $5,000]  - [(20%  x $60,000 x 10)  + $25,000]. The
plaintiff will  not  seek to  match  the  defendant's  $25,000  investment, since  the marginal  ex-
penditure of $20,000  would only lead  to  a gain of $10,000 = [(70%  x  $60,000)  - $25,000]  -
[(20%  x  $60,000)  - $5,000].
29.  See  STEVEN  SHAVELL,  FOUNDATIONS  OF  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF LAw  401-03  (2004).
30.  If anything,  the defendant bank  likely would  hold  the upper  hand in  settlement
negotiations, aggravating  its structural  advantage.
31.  $36,000  =  (Defendant's  Expected  Costs  + Plaintiff's  Expected  Recovery)  /  2  =
{[(60%  x $60,000)  + $5,000]  + [(60%  x $60,000)  - $5,000]}  /  2.
32.  $10,750  =  {[(20%  x $60,000)  + ($25,000  /  10)]  + [(20%  x $60,000)  - $5,000]}  /  2.
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4.  The Bias  Grows  with  the Number of Plaintiffs  Confronting  a
Common Defendant
A defendant's  superior  litigation  power  grows with  the number
of claims prosecuted  independently  in individual arbitrations. Per-
versely,  a defendant  is increasingly  more likely  to avoid  answering
for the harms  it causes when those  harms affect a greater percent-
age of the  population.
Again  taking up our example, suppose  that the defendant bank
discussed above  faced one  hundred common question  claims  (giv-
ing it a $6  million classwide  stake in  the  outcome  of the common
questions)  and that the parties can each  invest $5,000,  $25,000, or
$100,000.  If both parties invest the same amount, the plaintiff will
win  $60,000 in each  individual arbitration with  probabilities of 60,
70,  or  90  percent,  respectively.  Further  assume  that  if the  bank
spends either  $25,000  or $100,000  while  the  plaintiff spends  only
$5,000, plaintiffs probability of succeeding at trial will be 20 and 10
percent,  respectively.  Knowing  the  plaintiff will  stick with  $5,000,
the  bank will  make  a  rational  decision  to  increase  its  investment
from $25,000  to $100,000,  reducing  each plaintiffs net recovery to
$1,00033  and  the bank's  total  expected  costs of liability and litiga-
tion by $525,000  across  all claims.34
As  the  number  of independently  prosecuted  arbitration  claims
increases,  the  defendant  bank's  stake  increases  relative  to  each
plaintiffs,  so the  defendant  bank  is  likely  to  have  even more  op-
tions  for  marginal  investments  that  will  lower  its  total  costs  of
liability and litigation  across  all claims. With a $6  million  classwide
stake (compared to each plaintiffs $60,000),  it is thus reasonable to
assume  that the bank might be  able to spend quite a bit more, say
$300,000,  to reduce each plaintiffs  chance of recovery at trial to  1
percent. Under  the circumstances,  this would  be  an  economically
rational  investment because  spending  $200,000  more on the  mar-
gin classwide  lowers  total  expected  costs  of liability  and  litigation
across all claims by $340,000.3  However,  this marginal classwide  in-
vestment  would  wipe  the  plaintiffs  off the  map.  If a  prospective
plaintiff anticipates  the defendant making such an investment for a
99 percent chance of winning at trial, he or she would never file in
33.  $1,000  =  (10%  x $60,000)  - $5,000.
34.  $525,000  = [(20% x $6,000,000)  + $25,000]  - [(10%  x $6,000,000)  + $100,000].  In
settlement, each  plaintiff would expect to receive only $4,000.  $4,000 = {[(10% x $60,000)  +
($100,000/100)l  + [(10% x $60,000)  - $5,000]}  /  2.  If each plaintiff would incur fixed costs
of $1,500, then the defendant's credible threat to invest $100,000 would preempt the filing of
all  claims.
35.  $340,000  = [(10% x $6,000,000)  + $100,000]  - [(1%  x $6,000,000)  + $300,000].
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the first place (or would drop the claim immediately with  the hope
that a lenient  defendant will  not seek  costs).  Ultimately,  as  more
individual claimants confront a common defendant, that defendant
will  have  an  incentive  to  spend  more  on  common  litigation  ex-
penses, reducing even further the chance that plaintiffs recover  on
their specific claims  . 6
B.  The Class Counsel Solution
The foundational insight shaping our proposal is that the causal
driver of the  Concepcion bias is the asymmetry between  defendant's
classwide  stake  and a plaintiffs personal  recovery stake in the out-
come of the common  question litigation. The solution is to correct
this asymmetry by vesting  the plaintiff-side  with a classwide stake in
that  outcome  equivalent  in  scope  to  the  defendant's.  Certifying
class arbitration for classwide  trial is sufficient for effecting this cor-
rection, but it is not necessary. Class arbitration works because, and
36.  The defendant can also inflate its stake to magnify the Concepcion bias. Thus, in  Con-
cepcion, the  defendant stipulated  that it would  pay  double  the  attorney's  fee  plus  $7,500
(subsequently  raised to  $10,000)  to a plaintiff who won an  arbitration award exceeding the
company's  pre-arbitration  settlement offer.  131  S.  Ct. 1740,  1744  & n.3  (2011).  This  self-
imposed  "penalty" prompted  both the  majority  and dissenters  to speculate  about  its  pro-
plaintiff implications.  See  id. at  1753;  id. at  1760  (Breyer, J.,  dissenting).  The majority  and
dissenters  might have  viewed  the penalty's  pro-plaintiff implications  in terms of mitigating
the Concepcion bias  (if they had  recognized the problem).  The evidence,  however,  seems to
support  neither  the  majority's  hypothesis  that  the  promised  bonus  for  winning  would
strongly induce plaintiffs to file claims, see Coneffv. AT&T Corp., 620 F. Supp.  2d 1248,  1258
(W.D. Wash.  2009)  (noting the paucity  of arbitration  claims  filed  despite  defendant's  pro-
consumer provisions),  rev'd and remanded, 673 F.3d 1155  (9th Cir. 2012),  nor the dissenters'
prediction  that the defendant would simply  pay the face  value of a claim-certainly AT&T
had not paid the Concepcion  plaintiffs anything. In any event, rather than operate in plaintiffs'
favor to mitigate the Concepcion bias,  the penalty provision likely would produce  the perverse
opposite result. While the promise of a bonus for winning raises a plaintiff's individual stake,
it  simultaneously  raises  by far  more  the  defendant's  classwide  stake.  On  the  related  bias-
enhancing  effects of cost-shifting  rules,  see Rosenberg  & Spier, supra note  7,  at 37  (noting
that  English-style  fee-shifting  can increase  the  magnitude  of defendants'  advantage  when
structural  bias gives them a high probability of victory).  Thus, in the above example involving
one  hundred  claims  each  for  $60,000,  the  defendant  would  have  the  incentive  to  invest
$100,000  to lower  the plaintiffs chance of recovery  from  60  to 10  percent, but it would  not
have  the  incentive to invest $500,000  to  further lower  the plaintiffs chances  to  0.1  percent.
However,  if it had to pay a $20,000  penalty  on any winning  claim, the  defendant would be
motivated to  invest the additional $400,000 on the margin to reduce  each plaintiffs chance
of winning at trial on the common  question to 0.1 percent, thereby profiting from a marginal
reduction  in total expected liability and litigation  cost from $900,000  to $508,000.  900,000  =
{[10%  x ($60,000 + $20,000)  x 100]  + $100,000};  $508,000 = {[0.1%  x ($60,000 + $20,000) x
100]  + $500,000}.  Thus, even  if the defendant  is not obligated by law to pay the costs or  a
penalty to  a winning plaintiff, it might  do so voluntarily depending on which  arrangement
yields  it the greater classwide  investment advantage  over  the plaintiff.
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only because, appointed class counsel has a vested stake in the class-
wide  outcome  of the  common question  litigation.  The  Concepcion
bias  is  completely  eliminated  when  the  class  action  commences,
which is long before  classwide  trial; indeed, it is eliminated as  soon
as class counsel  is appointed and vested with the classwide  stake  in
the outcome of the common  question litigation.  While it may have
other advantages, processing the collective action through classwide
trial is thus entirely superfluous for purposes of achieving symmetri-
cal  investment  incentives.  Nothing  more  than  appointing  class
counsel  is required  to end  Concepcion's pro-defendant  bias.
Based on this  understanding,  our solution  for  Concepcion's pro-
defendant  bias  is  designed  to work  effectively  and fully  simply  by
appointing  class counsel  to represent each  class member's  claim in
an  individual  arbitration.  Classwide  trial, judicial  or arbitral, does
not  occur under  our  plan.  Hence,  the  class  counsel  solution  we
propose  is  consistent  with  Concepcion's prohibition  against courts,
state legislatures, and arbitrators furthering any public policy goals,
however socially  beneficial  they may  be, by requiring  class arbitra-
tion against or outside the parties'  arbitration  agreement.
1.  Class Counsel Appointment  Solves  Concepcion Bias Without
Classwide Trial
The coherence  and effectiveness  of the class  counsel solution  is
evident when applied  in the  above  examples. Return  to the  mort-
gage fraud case involving  ten  common question  arbitration claims
for  $10,000  each  and  parties'  options  to  spend  either  $5,000  or
$12,000 on common question discovery and experts.37  Recall that if
each side spent the same amount, the plaintiff's probability  of win-
ning  at  trial  in  the  individual  arbitration  would  be  60  and  70
percent, respectively. However, as the beneficiary  of the  Concepcion
bias, the defendant bank wielded its  asymmetric  incentive to invest
$12,000  against the plaintiffs investment  of $5,000, thereby reduc-
ing  the  plaintiff's  chance  of winning  to  10  percent.  Indeed,  as
noted  above,  the  bank's  marginal  classwide  investment  of $7,000
renders  the  plaintiffs'  claims  worthless,  thereby  shielding  it from
civil  liability  for  harm  caused  by any  violation  of law it may  have
committed.
This biased result would never occur if class counsel represented
each  plaintiff in his  or her individual  arbitration. Vested  with  the
classwide  stake  in  the  expected  recovery  across  all  claims,  class
37.  See supra Part I.A.1-2.
1166 [VOL.  46:4The Class Counsel Solution
counsel would have  an economically  sound justification for match-
ing the  defendant's $12,000  investment.  By spending this amount,
class counsel  increases  the plaintiffs'  classwide  expected net recov-
ery on the common  questions  from $0  to  $58,00038  and individual
net recovery from trial  by $5,800.  In the example,  the bank would
also  spend  $12,000  rather  than  $5,000  because  the  additional
$7,000  investment effects  a $13,000  marginal  reduction  in  its  total
expected  costs  of liability  and  litigation.39  Claims  plaintiffs  never
would  have  pursued  without  class  counsel  become not just viable
but highly valuable  after balancing  investment incentives.
Crucially, the appointment  of class counsel alone  eliminates  the
Concepcion bias regardless  of whether the classwide,  stake-driven  in-
vestment  in  the  common  questions  is  deployed  to  make  the
plaintiff's case  in each of a series  of individual  arbitration trials or
in a single classwide  arbitration  trial. Class counsel  makes the same
classwide  investment  in  developing  the  plaintiff-side  case  for trial
on the  common  questions  to  counter the  classwide  investment by
the defendant. Matched up against each other in a given individual
arbitration,  the parties'  respective  $12,000  common  question cases
will  result in each plaintiff having  a  70 percent probability of win-
ning  $10,000  at  individual  arbitration  trial  for an aggregate  gross
expected  recovery  of $70,000,  yielding an  aggregate  net expected
recovery of $58,000 and per claim  net expected  recovery of $5,800.
The same  essential  result would  obtain  if the  parties matched  up
their $12,000  common  question cases at classwide arbitration  trial:
aggregate  gross expected  recovery  for plaintiffs of $70,000 and  ag-
gregate net expected recovery  of $58,000 with  a per claim expected
recovery of $5,800.40
2.  The  Class  Counsel Solution Maximizes  the Value of
Economically Viable  Claims
To  extend  the  basic  analysis,  take  the  modified  example,  in
which  each  plaintiffs  claim  has  positive  net  expected  recovery
value.41 In this example, each of the ten claims  is worth $60,000,  the
38.  $58,000  = (70%  x $10,000  x 10)  - $12,000.
39.  $13,000  = [(90% x  $100,000)  + $5,000]  - [(70%  x $100,000)  + $12,000].
40.  Here, we  are assuming there are no non-common  questions that might require reso-
lution  subsequent  to  resolution  of the  common  questions  by  classwide  trial. Resolving  the
common  question  by a single  classwide  arbitration  trial  may entail  more  or  less  cost than
resolving  them  in  a  series of individual  arbitration  trials  in  which  the  plaintiffs  are  repre-
sented by class counsel. We consider  this point in  the overall assessment of the social welfare
consequences of our  proposal  in Part  III.
41.  See supra Part I.A.3.
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higher  common  question  investment  is  pegged at $25,000,  and  if
only one party invests that amount, while  the other invests $5,000,
the  party  making  the  higher  investment  will  have  an  80  percent
chance  of succeeding  at  trial  in  an individual  arbitration.  Recall
that  although  the  defendant  anticipated  each  plaintiff  filing  a
claim, it also recognized  that plaintiffs would not spend more than
$5,000  each. The asymmetric  investment incentives  provide defen-
dant  with  ample  motivation  to  spend  the  marginal  $20,000  to
increase its probability of winning at trial in each individual arbitra-
tion from 40  to 80 percent, thereby reducing  each plaintiff's gross
expected recovery  from $36,000  to $12,000  (and net from $31,000
to $7,000)  and the defendant's  total expected  costs of liability and
litigation by $220,000.
If  plaintiffs  were  represented  by  class  counsel,  however,  they
would have the incentive to match defendant's marginal investment
of $20,000.  Spending that additional amount, class  counsel would
convert  a  marginal  decrease  in  plaintiffs'  expected  net  recovery
classwide of $260,000 and  individually of $25,50042  into a marginal
net gain of $35,000,  yielding $395,000  classwide  and $39,500  indi-
vidually.43  Similarly,  the  defendant  would  match  class  counsel's
additional expenditure of $20,000  to avoid incurring $40,000  in in-
creased  total  expected  costs  of  liability  and  litigation."  In
equilibrium, each  party spends $25,000  with the result that the  de-
fendant incurs $445,000  in classwide  total expected costs of liability
and litigation, while  plaintiffs obtain  expected net classwide  recov-
ery  of  $395,000  at  trial  across  all  individual  arbitrations. 45  With
42.  Assuming both parties start at $5,000  each and the defendant  moves  first to  invest
$20,000 more to confront class counsel  with a net decrease in expected  recovery classwide  of
$260,000  =  [(60%  x $600,000)  - $5,000]  - [(20%  x $600,000)  - $25,000]  and  individually of
$25,500  = ($355,000  /  10)  - ($100,000  /  10).
43.  By investing $20,000  more, class counsel increases the probability of success from  60
percent to  70 percent and thus net classwide recovery from  $355,000  to $395,000 = [(70%  x
$600,000)  - $25,000],  and individually from $25,000 to $39,500 =  [(70% x $600,000 - $25,000)
/  10].
44.  Assuming both  parties start at $5,000  each  and class  counsel  moves  first  to  invest
$20,000  more to confront the defendant with  a net  increase in its expected total  liability of
$40,000  = [(80%  x $600,000)  + $5,000]  - [(70%  x $600,000)  + $25,000].
45.  Note  that  each  party  spending the same  amount  is an  artifact  of the example.  If
plaintiffs  instead had a 75 percent chance of winning at trial when each party invested at the
higher level,  the defendant might not match class counsel's $25,000  investment, as it  would
only yield a marginal reduction of $10,000 in its total expected costs of liability and litigation.
Likewise,  the numerical  example  could readily be  modified  to  reverse  the result with  class
counsel  finding the additional expenditure  uneconomical.  As noted above, the fact that the
class  counsel  solution corrects  the  Concepcion bias by vesting  class counsel  with  a  classwide
stake  equivalent in  scope  to defendant's  does  not  imply  the  parties  will  spend  the  same
amounts in individual arbitration  trials on the common questions.  In reality, where  the par-
ties  have  continuously  calibrated  investment  options,  the  variance  in  their  relative
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stakes  and  incentives  balanced,  more  meritorious  litigation
proceeds.
3.  The  Class Counsel  Solution Prevents  Defendants from
Rendering  Otherwise Viable  Claims Valueless
The  class  counsel  solution  also  prevents  a  common  defendant
from preempting  litigation altogether by exploiting  the  Concepcion
bias  in  cases  involving  numerous  claims  or  non-negligible  fixed
costs.  Under  our  proposal,  plaintiffs  will  no longer  be  subject  to
increasing bias as the number of individual arbitrations grows. Any
greater  classwide  scale  efficiencies  in  cases  involving  numerous
claims  will  accrue  in  equal  degree  to  both  parties.  And,  because
class counsel nullifies the  Concepcion bias,  the defendant will not be
able to render the claim worthless  by using asymmetric  investment
incentives to drive the plaintiff's expected recovery  in an individual
arbitration below fixed costs. Thus, our proposal nullifies the defen-
dant's liability-evading  strategy in  the above  example where, under
the  Concepcion-biased system,  the  defendant could spend  $100,000
to  drive  the  expected  net  recovery value  of the  arbitration  claim
below  the $1,500  fixed cost barrier. With  classwide  stakes equal  to
defendant's,  class  counsel  would  match  the  $100,000  investment,
spending  $95,000  more  on  the  margin  to  dramatically  swing  the
classwide  outcome  on the  common questions  from $0  to $5.3  mil-
lion in  aggregate  expected net recovery.
expenditures will  likely be far smaller than in  the example  with only two discrete  and widely
separated  options.
That the parties cumulatively spend less than  the amount at stake is also an artifact of the
example. To favorably affect the outcome at trial,  a rational  civil litigant will invest up to the
amount he or she  might win or lose.  In reality, the point of negative diminishing  marginal
benefit (return)  will  arrive short of that amount but often not before  the party's  spending
and that of his or her adversary in combination exceeds the monetary value of the outcome
over which  they are disputing. This is all the more likely in  cases involving  property that has
subjective  as  well  as objective  value. Although  the  general  economic  laws  of  civil litigation
apply to disputes over classwide stakes, it is reasonable to surmise that occasions when parties'
jointly spend more than  the amount in controversy  occur less frequently  when both parties
have classwide  investment stakes in arbitration because of its streamlined process, the chance
for more coordination  and cooperation  between lead counsel on both sides, and other prac-
tical considerations  such  as arbitrator expertise.  But see AT&T Mobility LLC v.  Concepcion,
131 S. Ct. 1740,  1751  (2011)  (noting that class arbitration is slower, costlier, and more reliant
on procedural formality  than bilateral arbitration).
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4.  The Solution  Negates  Biasing of Settlement Values
Class counsel representation  negates the Concepcion bias in settle-
ment, as well as at trial in the  individual arbitration. In short, class
counsel  representation  prevents  the  skewing  of  the  settlement
range  in  defendant's  favor due  to  the  parties'  asymmetric  stakes
and related  investment  incentives;  instead,  the  range  becomes  an
unbiased  reflection  of the parties'  equivalent opportunities  to  ex-
ploit classwide  scale efficiencies.
To show the settlement effects of our proposal, assume  the par-
ties  would  each  spend  $25,000  on  the  common  questions,  giving
the  plaintiffs a  70  percent probability  of winning $60,000  in  their
individual  arbitrations. In the absence  of class  counsel representa-
tion,  each  individual  arbitration  settlement  would  likely  occur
within a range distorted by the defendant's  asymmetric  investment
advantage.  Each  plaintiff would  accept  nothing  less  than  the  ex-
pected arbitral judgment, minus the investment required to obtain
it, equal in  the example  to  $17,000.46  The  defendant would  offer
nothing  more  than  the  expected  arbitral judgment  plus  the  per
claim share  of  the  common  defense  investment:  in  the  example
$44,500. 47 If the parties settle at the mean, each plaintiff will receive
$30,750.  By contrast, class  counsel representation  leads each plain-
tiff to set his or her reservation  point to reflect the spreading of the
common question  investment. Because a plaintiff therefore  will ac-
cept  nothing  less  than  $39,500,48  the  settlement  range  shifts
significantly in his  or her favor;  in  this example the  mean now be-
comes  $42,000.  As  with  litigation  decisions,  the  class  counsel
solution shields  settlement  values  from the  pro-defendant  Concep-
cion bias.
II.  PROPOSAL  DESCRIBED  AND  SOCIAL  CONSEQUENCES  EVALUATED
This Part sketches how the proposal works in practice. For conve-
nience, the description focuses on federal courts implementing the
class counsel solution  in a case  like  Concepcion. 49 Following this  dis-
cussion  is a social welfare assessment of the proposal that examines
46.  $17,000  = (70%  x $60,000)  - $25,000.
47.  $44,500  = (70%  x $60,000)  + ($25,000  /  10).
48.  $39,500  = (70%  x $60,000)  - ($25,000 /  10).
49.  We leave  to  another day more detailed consideration  of how state  courts might im-
plement  the  proposal.  We  also  do  not  address  whether  the  FAA  precondition  for
enforcement of arbitration  agreements-that the parties can  effectively vindicate their claims
of right-authorizes  arbitrators to adopt the class counsel solution pursuant to their general
rule-making  powers.
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its benefits and costs and compares its advantages to the chief alter-
native  of  relying  on  the  market  to  eliminate  Concepcion's  pro-
defendant bias. This analysis  generates  the central conclusion  that
the  class counsel  solution  effectively  and  efficiently  eliminates  the
Concepcion  bias in a manner the market cannot match, all while leav-
ing  intact  the  Court's  mandate  for  individual  arbitrations  and
transforming  that process  into  a socially beneficial  legal  system at
no significant social cost. We defer to Part III discussion of the pro-
posal's compatibility with  the FAA and federal  class action  rules.
A.  Class Counsel Solution in Operation
Judges must review the scope and validity of a challenged arbitra-
tion  agreement  before  ordering  its  enforcement.5 0  The  need  for
courts to consider the use of the class counsel solution is therefore
contingent  on  the  "gateway"  review  determinations. 5'  So,  before
describing  how  courts  would  implement  our  proposal,  we  briefly
outline  the  conventional  procedural  route  and  substantive  stan-
dards for making these  gateway decisions.
1. Judicial  Gateway  Review
Concepcion illustrates  the most common and straightforward  pro-
cedures  by  which  federal  courts  conduct  gateway  review  of
arbitration agreements. Plaintiffs file  a complaint and a related  mo-
tion for certification of a Rule  23 class action seeking classwide  trial
of their claims in court. The common defendant then moves for an
order compelling plaintiffs  to submit  to arbitration. 52
At this juncture,  when considering whether  to  mandate  arbitra-
tion, the court generally considers two sets of gateway questions:  (1)
arbitrability  under the contract;  and  (2)  validity and enforceability
50.  See,  e.g.,  Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,  No. 05cv1167 DMS  (AJB),  2008 WL 5216255,
at  *5,  *7-14  (S.D.  Cal.  Aug.  11,  2008)  (citation  omitted)  (denying defendant's motion  to
compel arbitration  after ruling against the validity of the arbitration agreement under state
contract law),  affld sub nom. Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849  (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd
sub nom. AT&T  Mobility  LLC v.  Concepcion,  131  S. Ct.  1740  (2011),  and amended in part,
Laster v.  T-Mobile  USA,  Inc.,  Nos.  06cv675  DMS  (NLS),  05cv1167  DMS  (WVG),  2012 WL
1681762  (S.D.  Cal.  May 9,  2012).
51.  See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc.  v. Jackson,  130 S. Ct. 2772,  2777-78  (2010)  (citations
omitted)  (internal  quotation  marks omitted).
52.  Although  Concepcion involved  a  federal  court  exercising  diversity jurisdiction  over
state claims  (upon removal from  state  court),  there is  no reason  to suppose  the case would
have followed a different procedural  path had plaintiffs sought enforcement of federal  con-
stitutional, statutory,  or common  law or had initiated  the case directly in federal  court.
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of the contract.5 3 Arbitrability concerns the scope of the arbitration
agreement's  binding  effect and  typically  regards  what  claims  are
covered  for what  parties.  Obviously,  our  proposal  is  not needed
when  a  court finds  that an agreement  subjects  no plaintiffs  or no
common  question  claims  to arbitration. The class counsel solution
comes  into play  only if the court  rules for  the defendant  on arbi-
trability, finding that the agreement subjects at least some plaintiffs
and common question  claims  to  arbitration.
On the second step, involving questions of invalidity, the applica-
tion of our proposal will vary. It will apply to correct the  Concepcion
bias if a court sustains the validity of an arbitration  agreement not-
withstanding its inclusion  of a no-class action  arbitration clause,  or
alternatively,  if the court invalidates  the agreement on the ground
that it contains  a no-class arbitration clause. Application of the pro-
posal  in  either  case  accords  with  Concepcion because  that  case
precludes  courts  from  imposing  class  arbitration  or other  public
policy fixes that would destroy the  procedural efficiency  of arbitra-
tion;  the  class  counsel  solution  enhances  the  workings  of  the
individual  arbitration  process.5 4  However,  because  the  proposal
provides  no useful remedy for other defects in  the arbitration pro-
cess,  it would  not apply if a court  invalidates  the  no-class  counsel
clause  (or the agreement as a whole)  on grounds unrelated  to the
Concepcion bias.
2.  Judicial  Implementation  of the  Class Counsel Solution
Our  proposal  contemplates  that courts-here  focusing on fed-
eral courts-would implement the class  counsel solution, adhering
to  the  standard  process  and  criteria  for certifying  Rule  23(b) (3)
class  actions.  However,  a court would  only perform  two  functions
related to  the proposal:  initiating and closing the  class action.  The
following overviews  both steps.
a.  Class action initiation
First, a court  must determine  whether  to  certify  an arbitration-
claim  class  action  for  purposes  of appointing  class  counsel  to re-
present  class  members  in  individual  arbitrations.  Upon  such
53.  See  Mitsubishi  Motors  Corp.  v.  Soler  Chrysler-Plymouth,  Inc.,  473  U.S.  614,  628
(1985);  see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson  Lane Corp.,  500 U.S.  20, 26  (1991).
54.  See  discussion  infra Part  III.
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certification,  the court must appraise  the adequacy of available  ap-
plicants  for the  post of  class counsel  and appoint the  lawyer best
able  to provide such representation.
If the court orders  enforcement of an agreement with a no-class
arbitration  clause,  the  proposal  calls  for a simple  process. Having
sustained  arbitrability and validity of the clause,  the court proceeds
as  normal  to  deny the  pending motion  to certify  a  Rule 23(b) (3)
class action  for  classwide judicial  trial. The  court would  then  take
up plaintiffs'  motion to certify the arbitration claims for class action
treatment  only  to  the  extent  of  appointing  class  counsel  to  re-
present class members in  individual  arbitrations.
To implement our proposal, a court might also, during gateway
review,  adjudge  the  arbitration  agreement  invalid and  unenforce-
able  as  applied  on  the  grounds  that  it  unconscionably,
unreasonably,  or  in violation  of public  policy  biases  the  process
against  plaintiffs  and  prevents  them  from  effectively  vindicating
their claims.55 On this finding, the court could directly take up the
plaintiffs'  motion to implement the class counsel solution, or alter-
natively,  condition  enforcement  of the  no-class  arbitration  clause
on  the  defendant's  agreeing  to  allow  the  court  to  consider  the
motion.
The  principal  question  posed  by  the motion  to  implement  the
class  counsel  solution  is  whether  the  applicant  seeking  appoint-
ment  is able  (or who  among  rival  applicants  for  the  post is  best
able)  to adequately and effectively represent class members in their
respective  individual arbitrations  in accordance with Rule  23(g) (1)
criteria. If there  are  no applicants or none that possess  the qualifi-
cations  necessary  to  provide  such  representation,  the  court  will
deny the motion and, lacking an effective means of remedying  Con-
cepcion's pro-defendant  bias,  enforce  the  arbitration  agreement by
its terms, relegating  plaintiffs to a process of individual arbitrations
55.  See  Concepcion, 131  S.  Ct.  at 1746  (explaining that  the  "saving  clause"  of FAA  § 2
authorizes  courts  to  declare  arbitration  agreements  unenforceable  "upon such  grounds  as
exist at law or in  equity for the  revocation  of any contract" including "generally applicable
contract defenses, such  as  fraud, duress,  or unconscionability");  Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473
U.S. at 637  (requiring  as a condition  for enforcing  agreements  to arbitrate federal statutory
claims that the arbitration  process provide the means for a litigant to "effectively ...  vindicate
its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum" so that the underlying law  "will continue to
serve both its remedial and deterrent function").  For discussion of these bases for declaring
that the  Concepcion bias  renders  the arbitration  agreement  invalid  and unenforceable,  see
infra Part II.B.
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stacked  against them.56 If the court  concludes  that adequate  coun-
sel is  available  to provide  representation  in  individual arbitrations,
it will appoint  the applicant class  counsel for this purpose.
Upon making the appointment, the court will direct and oversee
notification  of  class  members  pursuant  to  Rule  23(c)(2)(B).
5 7
Counsel will inform members of the nature of the certification deci-
sion,  the  case-including  the  claims,  issues,  and  defenses
involved-and class counsel's assignment to represent each plaintiff
in his or her individual arbitration. Class members will also be  told
that they can opt-out of the class, and file or forfeit their arbitration
claims  as  they wish,  or remain  in the class  but subsequently  inter-
vene  in  their individual  arbitration  through  counsel  of their  own
choosing.5 8  Once  the  class  membership  is  fixed, the  court will  di-
rect class counsel to proceed in representing individual plaintiffs by
filing  and  prosecuting  their  respective  arbitration  claims.  Having
thus initiated the class counsel solution,  the court will suspend fur-
ther judicial  proceedings  related  to  implementing  the  proposal
pending the outcome  of the litigation, either by judgments  or set-
tlements in individual arbitrations or by settlement on an aggregate
or classwide  basis.
56.  The logical  and socially appropriate  remedy of declaring the agreement unenforce-
able appears  to be foreclosed  by  Concepcion. See 131  S.  Ct. at 1748.
57.  See FED.  R. CIrv.  P. 23(c)(2)(B)  ('[T]he court  must direct to class  members the best
notice  that is practicable  under  the circumstances,  including  individual  notice  to all  mem-
bers  who can  be  identified through  reasonable effort.").
58.  Generally,  class  members  who  do not opt  out may  still  intervene  in  class  actions
later, employing their own attorneys. Beyond  receiving documents and observing hearings  in
the common question  phase of the proceedings, such intervention  usually amounts  to noth-
ing  more  than  taking  over  the  non-common  question  phase  of the  litigation.  Here,  the
intervention  might take over  the entire claim  in the individual arbitration,  usually following
(and contingent upon)  resolution  of the common  questions in the plaintiffs'  favor. Whether
that lawyer could use class counsel's work product is a separate question.  Class counsel might
license  its use,  but if the intervening  lawyer gained access  to the information  through other
means,  say,  through the public domain, a  court-awarded  fee could, as in  MDL cases, tax the
fee of the intervening lawyer to  pay for class counsel's investment in the common questions.
See MANUAL  FOR  COMPLEX  LITIGATION  (FOURTH)  § 22.927  (2004)  ("If there is a combination
of individual  settlements and a  classwide settlement, the judge sometimes orders  individual
plaintiffs'  lawyers to pay a certain percentage of the fees they received into a common fund to
contribute  to  the  fees of the class  counsel,  whose  work  in  discovery  and  trial  preparation
contributed  to the settlement of the individual cases  as well."); Jeremy Hays,  The Quasi-Class
Action Model for Limiting Attorneys' Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 67  N.Y.U.  ANN.  SuRv. Amt.  L.
589,  629 (2012)  ("[11n  the Diet Drugs settlement, the transferee court ordered  the defendant
to  pay 9%  of each plaintiffs  award into a  separate account..,  to provide common-benefit
fees to attorneys for work those attorneys  did that benefitted the plaintiffs as a whole.").  The
Supreme  Court has articulated a  "common-fund doctrine" undergirding such bias-neutraliz-
ing results.  See,  e.g.,  Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478  (1980)  ("[T]his Court has
recognized  consistently that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers  a common fund for the bene-
fit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled  to  a reasonable  attorney's  fee from
the fund as a whole.").The Class Counsel Solution
b.  Class counsel fee award
Class  counsel's  classwide  investment  incentive  to  maximize  the
classwide  recovery  derives, under  our proposal  or in  class  arbitra-
tion, from  his  or her stake  in  that recovery. This  stake  ultimately
turns on the court's award of fees  and expenses  at the  close of the
arbitration process. Many modes and types  of fee arrangements  ex-
ist, including the possibility of individual agreements  between class
counsel  and  each plaintiff. However,  for present  purposes, we  as-
sume  that  courts  will  adopt  the fee-setting  conventions  used  for
class, consolidated,  and aggregate actions.59
Thus, as suggested,  the  court-awarded  fee will  be contingent  on
class counsel recovering  damages or other positive value  from indi-
vidual  arbitrations  and  settlements.  In  accord  with  standard
practice  and our proposal's  central objective  to put the defendant
and plaintiffs  on an  equal classwide  investment footing,  the  court
will  calculate  the fee-employing  a percentage,  lodestar, or mixed
approach-based  on  class  counsel's  aggregate,  classwide  invest-
ment and recovery.60  In other words, class counsel's fee must reflect
the nature of the classwide investment and recovery as a whole-an
amount that  is  by  definition  greater  than  the  sum  of  its  parts-
which  includes the investments and recoveries  that plaintiffs'  attor-
neys  would  have  made  in  independently  prosecuted  individual
arbitrations proceeding  under the reign of the  Concepcion bias. 6
1  It
59.  Any fee  award by the court would  be made  in accordance  with the procedural  and
substantive  criteria set forth in Rule 23(h)  and prevailing conventions and practices.  See, e.g.,
AM.  LAW  INST.,  PRINCIPLES OF  THE LAW  OF AGGREGATE  LITIGATION  (2010).  For a description  of
fee-setting conventions  in MDL and "quasi-class action"  cases, see generally Charles Silver  &
Geoffrey  P.  Miller,  The Quasi-Class  Action Method of Managing  Multi-District  Litigations:  Problems
and a Proposal, 63 VAND.  L.  REv.  107  (2010).
Pursuant to these  conventions, the defendant is likely to retain  its investment advantage
when courts limit class counsel's  fee to a  percentage of the aggregate recovery, indeed to an
artificially reduced  level  far  below  the general contingency  fee standard  of 33  percent.  See
Brian  T. Fitzpatrick,  An  Empirical Study  of Class Action  Settlements and Their Fee Awards,  7 J.
EMPIRCAL  LEGAL  STUD.  811,  830-31  (2010).  Thus, even  under  our proposal,  class counsel
would lack  a  fully optimal  incentive  to make  the  classwide investment that will counter  the
Concepcion bias.  Cf  Murray L.  Schwartz  & Daniel J. B.  Mitchell, An  Economic Analysis of the
Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22  STAN.  L.  REv.  1125,  1139  (1970)  (noting that
under a contingent fee arrangement there is  a gap between  the client's interest in maximiz-
ing  the  total  recovery  and  the  lawyer's  interest  in  maximizing  his  or  her  share  of  the
recovery).  Since  this constraint on class counsel's investment incentives  does not arise  from
the Concepcion bias and applies to percentage  fee arrangements in any context, we will  disre-
gard  its effects  in the ensuing analysis.
60.  SeeJudith  Resnik, Dennis  E. Curtis & Deborah  R. Hensler,  Individuals Within the Ag-
gregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71  N.Y.U.  L. REv.  296,  339-45  (1996).
61.  The synergistic nature of class counsel investing  to maximize the recovery on a class-
wide  rather than  claim-by-claim  basis explains  not only why  Concepcion's  pro-defendant  bias
arises in the absence of such classwide investment opportunities on the plaintiffs-side but also
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is  important  to  note  that  class  counsel's  work  in  maximizing  the
aggregate,  classwide  recovery  typically  includes  claim-specific  ex-
penditures  on  non-common  questions  as  well  as  classwide
investment  on  common  questions.  Consequently,  the  court  must
necessarily  compute  class  counsel's  fee  in  light of the  total  invest-
ment  and  recovery  (more  accurately  on  the  basis  of  the  total
investment  that maximizes  the expected aggregate, classwide recov-
ery)  from  litigation  of  the  non-common  as  well  as  common
questions.
B.  Social Welfare Assessment
We assess the benefits and costs of our proposal  and the market
alternative  in  accordance  with  the  Supreme  Court's  affirmation
that the validity of arbitration hinges on its providing the means for
a litigant to "effectively  ...  vindicate  [his or her]  statutory cause of
action  in  the arbitral forum" so  that the underlying  law  "will con-
tinue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function."6 2 Thus, we
why the class counsel solution works to eliminate the bias completely. Courts and commenta-
tors  frequently  neglect  this  crucial  feature  of centralized  investment  across  all  common
question  claims.  See,  e.g.,  In re  Bridgestone/Firestone,  Inc.,  288 F.3d  1012,  1020  (7th  Cir.
2002)  (denying class action treatment of mass tort claims because only a "decentralized pro-
cess"  of independently  tried  claims  would  "yield  the  information  needed  for  accurate
evaluation" of the claims involved); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,  51 F.3d 1293,  1299  (7th
Cir. 1995)  (overturning  certification  of class  because  it threatened  huge  classwide  liability
despite  the fact  that  the defendant  had won  twelve  of thirteen  prior independent  trials);
Charles Silver,  The  Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and  Judges in Multidistrict Litigations,  79 FoaD-
HAM  L. REv.  1985, 2001-02  (2011)  (arguing that lead counsel focuses on selecting cases that
will  maximize  billable  hours, rather  than  those  cases  that are strongest  and will  maximize
value  for  the plaintiffs).
62.  Mitsubishi  Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,  Inc.,  473 U.S. 614, 637  (1985).
The Court's  pre-condition for judicial  and, presumably, arbitral  enforcement  of arbitration
agreements  can  be  read narrowly  as  applying  only to causes  of action  arising from  federal
statutes. However, this reading is hard to accept, as it would imply a rather antisocial proposi-
tion: arbitration agreements are enforceable even  though the arbitration process contravenes
the deterrence,  compensation,  and other public policies of the substantive  law involved  by
preventing the litigants from vindicating all defenses as well as causes  of action, or all legally
protected  rights arising under constitutional,  statutory, or common law-state  as well as fed-
eral. Consequently, we read the Mitsubishi  test broadly to encompass  all sources of substantive
law inclusive of the  grounds of fraud,  duress, and unconscionability recognized  by the  FAA
§ 2 saving clause for revocation  of contracts. See9 U.S.C.  § 2  (2006). For further discussion of
the Mitsubishi and FAA  conditions on  the enforceability  of arbitration  agreements, see infra
Part III.A.
Because  arbitration  claims  generally  arise  from  contracts,  in some  fraction  of cases  the
parties may have expressly waived  all legal routes of recourse. In assessing the costs and bene-
fits of the effectiveness  of our proposal to ensure  the effective vindication  of plaintiffs'  legal
rights, we assume  that  the parties have  not so waived their  claims or that if they have,  such
waiver is not legally enforceable.  For the same reason, we also assume  that when the plaintiff
has not expressly waived  his or her claim, courts will not sustain  defendant's  argument thatThe Class Counsel Solution
proceed on the understanding that the social objective of enforcing
civil  liability  in  arbitration  is  identical  to  that  which  applies  to
courts:  attaining  maximum  net social  benefit from  civil  liability by
minimizing the  total relevant social costs of complying with, violat-
ing,  and  enforcing  the  law.63   Reconciling  this  fundamental
condition  for validating  arbitration  with  Concepcion's mandate  for
individual  arbitrations,  we  adopt  a  further  assumption-one  we
find implausible but that we  nonetheless will accept for the sake of
argument.  We  posit that Congress  deemed  individual  arbitrations
to be superior-on average, the most cost-effective  means of serving
the deterrence and compensation functions of civil liability in com-
mon question litigations-compared  not only to individual  or class
actions in  court, but also to  class  actions in arbitration.64
1. Benefits  of the Class  Counsel  Solution
The foregoing  analysis  leaves no doubt that  Concepcion's pro-de-
fendant  biasing  of  the  individual  arbitration  process  can
the plaintiff effectively waived the claim by agreeing to litigate against the defendant despite
its ability to  exploit  Concepcion's rigged  process to marshal an  overwhelming  common  ques-
tion defense.
63.  This  social  function  of civil  liability  (colloquially,  minimizing  the sum  of accident
costs)  is derived  from  the  path-breaking  analysis  in  GUIDO  CAtA.Rsi,  THE  COSTS  OF Acci-
DENTS:  A LEGAL AND  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  (1970).
64.  Our assumption treats  the pro-defendant  bias as an  unintended  byproduct of Con-
gress's  (qua the Concepcion Court's) mandate for individual  arbitrations. The problem of bias
goes without mention  by either the majority or dissent in  Concepcion, and we certainly would
not attribute to the Court or Congress an intention to give defendants a decisive upper hand
in arbitration  or to undercut civil liability enforcement  of substantive  law. The class counsel
solution is thus consistent with the FAA as interpreted by Concepcion  because  it eliminates the
unintended  pro-defendant  bias while  not merely  leaving  the individual  arbitration  process
intact, but, as discussed  below, by improving  and  facilitating  its  operation.
The Court might respond  that Congress  prescribed the "default rule" of individual  arbi-
trations  not  on  a  finding  that  this  process  was  superior  to  alternative  modes  of dispute
resolution, but rather on a reasonable inference drawn from the parties' consent to arbitrate
that they deemed  it so. We  reject this  possible  rejoinder, which  would require  accepting  a
formal, hollow legal fiction of "consent." In the type of small claim case the Court found best
suited for arbitration, it is unreasonable  to believe  that the individual  parties to  these adhe-
sive contract transactions-for  example in checking the  "I agree" box online-actually read
or  understood  the  no-class  arbitration  clause  and  expressed  an  informed  preference  for
non-class  arbitration.  It would be  the height  of lawmaking  arrogance for  Congress  to have
conditioned  the individual  parties'  rights to judicial  and class action enforcement of the law
on consulting lawyers for the meaning of the no-arbitration  clause in the sales  terms of every
product or service they buy, which for virtually everyone would be a sheer waste of time and
money. There  is no suggestion  in the statutory text or history that the  FAA was designed to
preempt rather than expedite enforcement of federal and state substantive law.  See, e.g.,  Dean
Witter Reynolds,  Inc.  v.  Byrd, 470 U.S.  213, 220  (1985)  (referencing legislative  history  that
indicated  a desire  to address "agitation against the costliness  and delays of litigation" (quot-
ing H.R. Rep. No. 96,  68th Cong.,  1st Sess.,  2  (1924))).
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undermine, and in many cases destroy, the social value of plaintiffs'
claims in promoting the deterrence  and compensation  function  of
civil liability. This biasing also frustrates related general  goals, such
as the use of civil liability for securities fraud as a means of assuring
investor  confidence  in  the  integrity  and  reliability  of markets  for
publicly traded  stocks.65 To protect these interests, a system that re-
solves  common  question  litigations in  individual  arbitrations  may
yet represent the most cost-effective means  of enforcing  the law be-
cause  it  provides,  in  the  Court's  view,  the  relatively  efficient,
streamlined  procedures  of the  arbitral process  without  envisioned
costs of classwide  trial.66
Although generally superior to judicial class actions, according to
the majority in  Concepcion, class arbitration  entails costs  that swamp
its benefits. 67 Questions concerning the structure of classwide repre-
sentation  and  trial  encumber  the  class  arbitration  process  with
time-consuming complexities and procedural formalities. And arbi-
trators, usually focused on the parties before  them, may struggle  to
account for absentee  due process rights. 68 Although  classwide trial
entails  special  procedural  and managerial  costs  that  fall  on  both
parties, what appears to be the real showstopper is its increased risk
for defendants. 69 Confronting the defendant with the prospect of a
single  classwide  trial  potentially resulting  in  a judgment for enor-
mous aggregate  damages forces  it to choose between "bet[ing]  the
company"  and  capitulating  to  "'in  terrorem'  settlement[  ]"  pres-
sures by paying questionable  claims.
7 0
65.  See Joel  Seligman,  Commentary,  The  Merits Do  Matter:  A  Comment  on  Professor
Grundfest's  'Disimplying  Private  Rights  of Action  Under the  Federal  Securities  Laws:  The
Commission's Authority,"  108 HARv.  L. REV.  438, 440  (1994)  ("Private  [securities]  litigation
performs  a  significant  role  in  maintenance  of  investor  confidence  by  enforcing  the
mandatory  disclosure  system.").
66.  A simple example illustrates  the implications of the Court's assumptions. Suppose a
series  of class actions with classwide  trial would produce  deterrence and compensation  bene-
fits  of $1,000,  but would  exact litigation  costs  of $800  or $700  respectively  in  court or in
arbitration.  It is evident that class arbitration minimizes total accident costs, resulting in max-
imum  net social  benefit of $300,  $100  more than  a resolution  in  court. Now  suppose  that
resolving  the same common  question claims by individual  arbitrations  would yield just $500
in  deterrence  and compensation  but would  tax  the parties only  $100  in litigation  cost. De-
spite  their  comparatively  deficient  deterrence  and  compensation  results,  individual
arbitrations  nonetheless  would  prove  the  best  means  of resolving  the  common  question
claims,  yielding maximum  net social  benefit of $400.
67.  See  131  S.  Ct.  1740,  1751  (2011).
68.  See  id. at 1751-52.
69.  Id. at  1752.
70.  Id. Oddly,  the Concepcion majority  reasoned that if defendants were faced  with  this
choice they would be compelled to jettison arbitration  in  favor of courts. See id. The assump-
tion that courts would not convene  class actions and impose  the same choice  is  implicit and
unsubstantiated.
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With  the Court's assumptions  taken as true, the class counsel so-
lution  provides  unalloyed  social  benefit.  It  completely  eliminates
Concepcion's pro-defendant  bias  in  individual  arbitrations,  yet cre-
ates  none  of the  costs  and  risks  of class  arbitration.  Recall  the
example in which the defendant confronts  ten claims each  seeking
$10,000  in  damages,  and assume  that by investing  $60,000  in pre-
cautions  it  could  avoid  the  risk  of  harm  entirely.  Given  its
Concepcion-biased asymmetric  stakes  and  classwide  investment  ad-
vantages,  the  defendant  lacks  any  legal  incentive  to  take  these
precautions  because  it anticipates  that  its  $12,000  expenditure  to
each  plaintiffs  $5,000  will  render  all  claims  worthless.  The  class
counsel solution rectifies  this socially destructive result. Vested with
a classwide stake in the outcome of the common question litigation,
class counsel  could  have  a  cost-effective  incentive  to  match defen-
dant's investment,  thereby increasing  the  chance  of each  plaintiff
winning in an  individual arbitration from  10  to 70 percent. Conse-
quently, ex ante, when contemplating whether  to invest $60,000  in
precautions,  the  defendant  would  confront  the  choice  between
spending  that amount or incurring total expected  liability and liti-
gation  cost  of $82,00071  and would  rationally  elect to  prevent  any
harm  from  occurring.  Obviously,  the  class  counsel  solution  pro-
motes  compensation  goals.  If  the  defendant  failed  to  invest  in
precautions, each plaintiff would expect to  recover $5,800 at trial72
and $7,000 in settlement, compared to $0  under the Concepcion pro-
defendant  biased regime.
But the class  counsel solution  does not simply leave  the individ-
ual arbitration  process  intact;  it  makes the  process  more  efficient
and more  efficacious. 73 Judicial appointment  of class  counsel saves
plaintiffs  the time, trouble, and expense of searching for and hiring
their  own  personal  lawyers.  All  plaintiffs  can-and  virtually  all
will-benefit from  the court screening for attorney quality and set-
ting  the fee  and other  terms for class  counsel's  representation  of
claims  in individual  arbitrations. 74  Early  on, class  counsel  will  de-
velop the classwide case for liability on the common  questions that
71.  $82,000 = (70%  x $10,000  x 10)  + $12,000. In settlement, defendant would likely pay
out $70,000.
72.  $5,800  = (70%  x $10,000)  - ($12,000/10).
73.  The FAA does not preempt state legislative  and judicially imposed conditions on  the
enforcement of arbitration agreements that promote the use and efficiency of arbitration.  See
Volt Info.  Scis.,  Inc.  v. Bd.  of Trs.  of Leland  Stanford Junior  Univ.,  489  U.S.  468,  474-78
(1989).
74,  Plaintiffs  who  exercise  their  opt-out  or intervention  prerogatives  will  also  benefit
from  the record and analysis created by the court in choosing  their own counsel.  The effort
to  hire separate  counsel, however,  will suffer  from lack of scale efficiencies  as well  as saddle
the plaintiff with high cost for his or her attorney to coordinate with class counsel in litigating
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will be  deployed  thereafter in  the many hundreds or thousands  of
ensuing  individual  arbitrations  for  low  or  no  marginal  cost.  In
short, the  class  counsel  solution  transforms  the individual  arbitra-
tion  process into  a socially responsible  system of law enforcement
by at once eliminating Concepcion's pro-defendant bias and enabling
plaintiffs  to  avoid duplicative  expense and  capitalize  on  classwide
scale  efficiencies.
2.  Costs of the  Class Counsel  Solution
Given  our conclusion  that the  class counsel  solution  maximizes
net social benefit by cost-effectively promoting the substantive  law's
deterrence  and  compensation  objectives,  we  now inquire  directly
whether  this  net-benefit  evaluation  holds after accounting  for any
costs it imposes on the individual  arbitration  process.75 To address
this question realistically, we compare  the effects of our proposal to
the benchmark  of the individual  arbitration process  in  operation
under Concepcion. However, we shall ignore Concepcion's bias insofar
as  it precludes  plaintiffs  from  filing  claims  and  thus  assume  that
plaintiffs  will file and prosecute  the same number of claims in indi-
vidual  arbitrations  under  the  benchmark  regime  as  under  our
proposal-reformed  regime. We find that the only significant effects
of our proposal  on FAA objectives  are  positive.
Because  the  class  counsel solution  operates within the  procedu-
ral  framework  of  the  individual  arbitration  process,  the  only
complaint  that  could  be  lodged  against  the  proposal  is  that  ap-
pointing  class counsel  could delay the  start of the arbitration.7 6 Of
course, some delay is already inevitable. Unless the FAA is read mis-
takenly  to  put  its  preemptive  weight  behind  enforcement  of
no-legal  representation  as well  as  no-class action  clauses,  plaintiffs
necessarily will require a reasonable amount of time to seek counsel
for  an  evaluation  of whether  and  how  best  to  prosecute  their
claims.  To be meaningful,  this opportunity cannot be measured  in
the common  questions. Those who choose  to proceed without the benefit of class counsel's
classwide  investment  on  the common  question  likely will  face the  magnified  force of the
defendant's  Concepcion-biased  investment advantage.  See Rosenberg  & Spier, supra note  7,  at
40-41.
75.  It  should be  noted that the  FAA sets no schedule  or deadline for judicial  enforce-
ment of the agreement  to arbitrate. See9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006);  cf. Volt Info. Serus., 489 U.S. at 474
("[Tihe FAA  does not confer a right to compel  arbitration of any dispute at any time.").  For
general analysis of our proposal's  compatibility with the FAA as interpreted  by Concepcion, see
infra Part III.A.
76.  The court's determination  of class counsel's  fee  and expenses has  no effect  on  the
processing of arbitration  claims and  thus has  no relevance  to  FAA objectives.
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absolute  time  periods.  Rather,  the  amount  of time  the  plaintiff
should reasonably have and take will vary according to the nature of
the claim.  However,  as  is  evident from  the claim-aggregation  mar-
ket  in which  a plaintiff rarely,  if ever,  proceeds  "solo,"
77  plaintiffs
will  rationally seek legal  representation  that promises  to  make the
most  cost-effective  case  for recovery on the  common question  ele-
ments of the case-essentially by aggregating the classwide stake to
rationally motivate  making a classwide investment on the  common
questions. Thus, even without our proposal, the period for selecting
counsel must allow plaintiffs time to identify the best representative
to marshal and  manage  a  classwide investment  that will  maximize
the  expected  recovery  from the  claims  involved and,  in  so  doing,
negate  the  Concepcion bias.
As an empirical matter, federal court implementation of our pro-
posal will do little to delay the start of arbitration. Indeed, it is likely
to expedite it. To be sure, initiating the proposal involves applying
Rule  23(a)  and  (b) (3)  conditions  for  class  certification  and  ap-
pointing class counsel. In other situations, this process can enmesh
the parties  and court in  complex and time-consuming  inquires re-
lating  to the  appropriateness  of classwide  trial, which  can require
determining  the  predominance  of common  questions,  the  cohe-
siveness  of  class  member  interests,  and  the  manageability  of
collectively adjudicating  claims arising under differing laws and fac-
tual circumstances.  But questions  of this sort are irrelevant  to  the
implementation of our proposal for the simple reason that the class
would be certified  and class counsel appointed  solely for represen-
tation  of  class  members'  arbitration  claims  in  individual
arbitrations.  The  proposal  entails no classwide  representation,  no
classwide binding effects, and no classwide trial; essentially, the class
action  only affords  class  members judicial  assistance  to  overcome
the practical  barriers and costs  of voluntary joinder.7
The  class  counsel  solution  presents  only  one,  straightforward,
and speedily resolvable question: who among the candidates for the
77.  See  Howard  M.  Erichson,  Informal Aggregation: Procedural  and Ethical Implications of
Coordination  Among  Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50  DuKE  L.J.  381,  383  (2000);  Rosenberg,
Mandatory-Litigation  Class Action, supra  note  7,  at 832-33.
78.  Even  if these  pre-certification  questions  bore  some  relevance  to  class  certification
under our proposal, their resolution would promote FAA objectives by greatly facilitating and
enhancing the individual arbitration process. This is because  virtually all of the work product
generated  by  classwide  discovery,  evaluation  of statistical and  other generalized  proof, and
related  merits  screening  aimed  at answering  these  questions  will  be  directly  usable in  the
arbitration process, thereby avoiding enormously complex, expensive,  time-consuming dupli-
cation  of effort  by the parties and by hundreds  or thousands  of arbitrators  in  hundreds  or
thousands  of individual  arbitrations.
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post of class  counsel  is best  able  to  adequately and  effectively  re-
present class  members in  their individual  arbitrations?  Generally,
the proposal requires  little if any additional  time and effort because
the court in most cases would have  considered  and decided the is-
sues  needed  to  determine  class  counsel  adequacy  as  an
independent,  preliminary  matter,  with  far  more  comprehensive
and  in-depth  scrutiny than  required  by the  class  counsel solution.
Courts  are routinely  called  upon  to  consolidate  class action  cases
and to  appoint  lead  counsel  before  taking  up matters  relating  to
the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 7 9  More  generally, pur-
suant  to  Rule  23(g) (3),  courts  will  increasingly  appoint  class
counsel on an interim basis or implicitly assign  class representation
to  a  lead  plaintiff's  attorney  of record  for purposes  of litigating
classwide,  common gateway questions as well  as jurisdictional issues
and  the  like.80  Thus,  courts  will  have  already  completed  what  is
needed for an inquiry focusing  on the  much  narrower, workaday
question of whether class counsel can satisfy the normal obligations
of an  attorney  representing  an  individual  client  in  an  individual
action.
8'
79.  See,  e.g.,  Memorandum  of Points  and Authorities in Support of Motion  to Consoli-
date, Appoint Lead Counsel and Grant Other Relief, Italian Colors Rest. v. Am.  Express Co.,
No. C  03-03719  EDL  (N.D.  Cal.  Oct. 14,  2003)  (seeking the  appointment of lead  counsel
before  the court heard  motions  to compel-arbitration).
80.  See  FED.  R. Civ.  P.  23(g)(3)  ("The court may  designate  interim  counsel  to  act  on
behalf of a putative class before determining whether to certify the action as a class action.");
see also Laster v. T-Mobile  USA, Inc.,  No. 05cv1167  DMS  (AJB),  2008 WL 5216255, at *1, *13
(S.D.  Cal.  Aug.  11,  2008)  (treating  the  Concepcion  claims as  a "putative  class action" without
conducting  Rule  23  certification  procedures when  ruling  on  arbitrability),  affd sub  noma.
Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009),  rev'd sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion,  131  S. Ct. 1740  (2011), and amended in part,  Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., Nos.
06cv675  DMS  (NLS),  05cv]167  DMS  (WVG),  2012  WL  16$1762  (S.D.  Cal.  May  9,  2012).
Interim class representation  will  also be needed for resolution  of such classwide  questions as
those  regarding jurisdiction  and preliminary injunctive  relief. Notably, courts often consider
class certification  before  deciding whether to enforce  arbitration agreements.  See, e.g.,  Her-
rera  v.  LCS  Fin.  Servs.  Corp.,  274  F.R.D.  666,  681  (N.D.  Cal.  2011).  But  see Amar  Shakti
Enters.  v. Wyndham  Worldwide,  Inc.,  No.  6:10-cv-1857-Orl-31KRS,  2011  WL  3687855,  at *2
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 22,  2011)  (distinguishing the instant case from  the convention  of first decid-
ing  class  certification  because  plaintiffs  interposed  no  argument  that  enforcing  the
arbitration agreement would "offend public policy, or offer any other reason why arbitration
would be  inappropriate").
81.  The  Rule 23 fair  and adequate  class representation  inquiry is aimed in part at deter-
mining whether class counsel will be placed in the position of having to represent conflicting,
or at least significantly differing, interests among class members in the resolution of common
questions  by  classwide  trial.  See  Amchem  Prods.,  Inc.  v.  Windsor,  521  U.S.  591,  625-27
(1997).  We emphasize  that no such problem exists under our proposal.  As a practical  as well
as formal  matter, the class counsel solution  provides only personal, individual representation
to class members. Formally, putative class members will receive notice-often, because of the
contractual  basis of the  claims,  directly and individually-of  the individual  nature  of their
representation  on the specified claims and means of assuring their individual representationSUMMER  20131 The Class Counsel Solution
Our proposal  calls upon  the court  to assess  the attorney's  litiga-
tion experience,  legal expertise, and financial  and other resources
only in relation to making the classwide investment on the common
questions. This assessment requires  a court to gather and scrutinize
any  relevant information  it has not already  obtained  and  assessed
for purposes  of appointing  interim,  gateway  class  counsel.  In  all
likelihood,  the question  of adequacy will  be decided  expeditiously
and at little, if any, cost to the parties  or court. As noted above, any
cost  in  producing  the  public  record  documenting  and  assessing
class counsel's qualifications will be greatly outweighed by the bene-
fits  to  class members,  both for the vast majority  that probably will
rely on the  court's  selection of counsel  and for those who  instead
use  the  information  in  choosing  their  own  counsel  to  opt out or
intervene.
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by opting out of the class or intervening through their own  attorney. The practical meaning
of the  prerogative  to  intervene  is  that a plaintiff's  own  counsel will conduct  the individual
arbitration at least on the non-common  questions, and possibly on the common questions as
well, albeit  paying class  counsel  for use  of any classwide  work product.
82.  A court might raise  two  other questions  as it considers  implementing our proposal.
The first concerns the prerequisite that "the class is so numerous  thatjoinder of all members
is  impracticable."  FEn.  R. Cty.  P.  23(a)(1). Although  the "impracticality ofjoinder" explains
why the  courts should  intervene  pursuant  to  our  proposal  to  cut the costs  of effecting  the
voluntary joinder of plaintiffs,  very  few  cases  will  present a serious question  of numerosity
requiring judicial  consideration.  Generally,  the number  of potential  class members  will  be
large enough  to make presumptive joinder by class certification  more cost-effective than rely-
ing on the claims market. In contrast to class action aggregation subject to individual opt-out,
under market aggregation,  competing plaintiffs'  attorneys solicit  prospective  plaintiffs in or-
der  to  amass  common  claims  in  large  groups  (or  "inventories")  for  common  question
representation.  This competition  creates  duplicative  costs, and  in contrast to  class counsel
publicly  soliciting  claims  armed  with  a  court-decreed  "work  product  patent,"  competing
plaintiffs'  attorneys facing the prospect of free-riding will  restrict the content they will  publi-
cize to acquire claims and limit their overall investment well below the common defendant's.
Similarly,  though  class  certification  depends  on  the  existence  and  predominance  of
.questions  of law or fact common  to the class,"  FED.  R. Civ. P.  23(a) (2),  rarely would courts
be  called  upon  to  verify  satisfaction  of these  conditions.  First, the  existence  of such  ques-
tions-common  questions, the  elucidation  and  resolution  of which  benefit from  the scale
efficiencies  of classwide  investment-is  virtually  always obvious  on  the face of  a complaint
charging a government or business with systematically creating sanctionable risks or injuries.
See,  e.g.,  Amgen  Inc. v.  Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S.  Ct. 1184,  1194  (2013)  (recog-
nizing commonality from  the face of a securities complaint and  noting that "Rule  23 grants
courts no license  to engage  in  free-ranging  merits inquiries at  the certification  stage").  Sec-
ond, the condition can be readily satisfied for purposes of the class counsel solution because
it contemplates  only individual arbitration  trials and therefore  does not implicate  the  need
for a stricter test of common  question predominance  to assure the efficiency, manageability,
and cohesion of class  interest in classwide  trials. Third,  there is no need  to apply  the condi-
tion  at all in  certifying  a  class  action  pursuant  to our proposal  because  in  the absence  of
common questions, there would be no profit from,  and hence no motivation to seek, the post
of class counsel.
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3.  The Failure of Market Alternatives
There  are but two means by which plaintiffs can obtain represen-
tation  with  a  classwide  stake  within  the  constraints  imposed  by
Concepcion: the  class counsel  solution  and the  private  marketplace
for  legal  services.  But  leaving  plaintiffs  to  the  claim-aggregation
market  for  legal  representation  is  an  inadequate  and  extremely
costly  means  of addressing  Concepcion's pro-defendant  bias.  The
class  counsel solution,  by comparison,  completely negates  the bias
while  producing  social  savings  rather  than  costs.  In  essence,  the
proposal  affords  the  very  classwide  legal  representation  that  ra-
tional  plaintiffs  would  seek  and, assuming  the  impractical,  would
obtain in  the marketplace  to overcome  Concepcion's bias.  The only
difference between the two modes of "voluntaryjoinder" is that the
market  requires  a  costly  miracle  to  eliminate  the  bias,  while  the
class counsel solution achieves  this result automatically and without
costs.
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For  many  types  of common  question  litigations,  a  few  leading
plaintiffs'  attorneys  compete  to  acquire  large  shares  of  claims
(often  referred  to  as  "inventories")  to  create  the  aggregate  stake
and incentive  for making a corresponding  investment  in develop-
ing  the  common  question  case  against  the  defendant.84  The
impetus to aggregate  claims stems from both the natural quest for
profitable  returns from  scale efficiencies  and the recognition  that,
without  the  aggregate  investment  incentive,  litigating  common
questions  against  a defendant  with  a  classwide  stake  is  a hopeless
83.  Our  analysis  applies  to  all  class action  alternatives  that depend  on  the market  to
aggregate  claims, notably including  the use of collateral  estoppel  for offensive  issue preclu-
sion.  Thus,  under  the  collateral  estoppel  regime,  without  some  heretofore  undiscovered
means by which the market can aggregate  claims as cheaply and  completely as class counsel,
the defendant investing to maximize its aggregate defense stake will overmatch the first plain-
tiff who will only invest to  maximize the value of his or her specific  claim. For a comparison
of collateral estoppel and class action,  see David  Rosenberg,  Avoiding Duplicative Litigation of
Similar Claims: The  Superiority of Class Action  vs.  Collateral Estoppel vs.  Standard Claims Market
(Harvard  Law Sch.  Pub. Law,  Research  Paper No.  044, John  M. Olin Ctr. for Law,  Econ., &
Bus.,  Discussion  Paper No. 394, 2002),  available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract  id=354100.
84.  See Erichson, supra note 77, at 383-84, 388-89  (describing how competing attorneys
form  ad  hoc  arrangements  to cooperatively  prosecute  common  questions  claims);  Hay  &
Rosenberg,  supra  note 7, at 1380 n.8  (recognizing that in mass tort litigation, groups of plain-
tiffs'  attorneys  compete  for  market  shares  of claims);  Peter  H.  Shuck,  Mass  Torts:  An
Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80  CORNELL  L.  REv.  941,  952  (1995)  (noting the  "high
degree"  of informal  coordination  among  plaintiffs'  attorneys);  STEPHEN J. CARROLL  ET  AL.,
RAND  CORu.,  ASBEsros LrncrION 23-24 (2005),  available at http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RANDMG162.pdf  (finding that  the asbestos  litigation
has  been  prosecuted  for decades  mainly  by  a handful  of large, competing  law  firms, each
with  inventories comprising thousands of claims).
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venture.  Some  have  suggested  that  this  claim-aggregation  market
can  solve  problems  of asymmetric  investment incentives,  such  as
those  created  by  the  Concepcion bias  in  the  individual  arbitration
process.85
Leave-it-to-the-market prescriptions admit the existence and seri-
ousness  of pro-defendant  bias  (though often  only  implicitly),  but
they fall far short of solving the  problem  and, in  many cases,  can
make matters much worse. High costs, long delays, and other basic
defects prevent the market from efficiently-or virtually ever-pro-
ducing  a  plaintiff-side  stakeholder  with  classwide  investment
incentive equivalent in scope to a common defendant's; indeed, the
market's burdens and failings amplify the impact of the defendant's
biased investment advantage. Our proposal is a superior alternative
because it achieves  (presumptively, given  opt-out and intervention)
what the market cannot provide: universal and immediate voluntary
joinder of the common question  claims.
Although  market  forces  can  generate  large  inventories,  each
comprising  a sizable  but  far from dominant  market  share  of the
claims, such voluntary joinder comes at a high price. Searching for,
soliciting,  evaluating,  and  acquiring  common  question  claims  en-
tails substantial  outlays.  Consequently,  claims  with  relatively  small
amounts in controversy, especially when the claims accrue  in differ-
ent jurisdictions  and  time  periods,  will  likely  yield an  insufficient
aggregate return  to  attract  attorney  investors.  Competition  among
lawyers  compounds  these  costs. 86 In vying for greater market share
of claims,  the  competing lead  lawyers will  largely duplicate  efforts
and expenditures  as each prepares and prosecutes parallel cases on
the  common  questions.87 The common defendant's  (biased)  class-
wide  investment  advantage  will  surely  motivate  these  attorneys  to
coordinate  their  activities.  They  will  share  information,  though
85.  See,  e.g.,  Richard  A. Nagareda,  Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class
Action, 115 HIv. L.  REv.  747,  762 (2002).
86.  See John C.  Coffee, Jr.,  The Regulation of Entrepreneurial  Litigation: Balancing Fairness
and  Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U.  CHI.  L. REv. 877,  908  (1987).  Competition among
plaintiffs'  attorneys has become increasingly fierce as  markets for their services have shrunk.
See, e.g., Brian  Cheffins et al., Delaware  Corporate  Litigation and the Fragmentation  of the Plaintiffs'
Bar,  2012 COLUM.  Bus. L.  REv. 427, 466-67  (2012)  (attributing the rise of non-Delaware suits
against directors  of companies incorporated  in Delaware  to increased  competition  among
plaintiffs'  attorneys specializing  in securities and corporate  governance  litigation).
87.  From the 1970s through 2002, asbestos litigation, the longest running mass tort case
in U.S. history, cost $70 billion in attorney fees  and expenses. Defendants paid net compensa-
tion of $30 billion  to plaintiffs (before recovery by insurers on subrogation claims),  and thus
consumed  roughly $1.40  in overhead for every $1 in recovery  by a plaintiff. See Deborah  R.
Hensler,  As Time  Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem  and Ortiz,  80 Twx.  L.  REv.  1899,
1922-24  (2002);  CARROLL  ET AL.,  supra note  84, at xxvi-xxvii.
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rarely will it involve anything of particular value or importance;  at-
torneys  will  hold  their  best  cards  close  in  hopes  of winning  a
competitive  edge. Arrangements  among rivalrous  attorneys to pool
claims  and  possibly  to  centralize  investment  in  developing  aggre-
gate work product are  costly to  organize  and manage,  particularly
when it comes  to  negotiating  and enforcing agreements  that allo-
cate the burdens and benefits of the enterprise, including the need
to monitor for shirking, information leaks,  and defections.88
In addition to these transaction costs,  a major barrier to effective
collective  action  is free-riding.  Much  of the  leading  lawyers'  work
product will fall into the public domain  by way of publicly dissemi-
nated  trial  records  and  published  formal  opinions. 89  Though
information does  not flow quite  as freely with arbitration, the pros-
pect  of  free-riding  still  creates  a  first-mover  disadvantage  that
reduces  the  amount  and  value  of the  information  produced.90
When  competitors  co-opt expensive  work product, lawyers will  ex-
pect  a  smaller  return  and  have  less  incentive  to  invest;  those
otherwise  motivated  to  invest  may  instead  hold  back  in  order  to
capitalize  on the fruits of others'  labor.91 Free-riding and other re-
lated  costs  prevent  competing  plaintiffs'  attorneys  from
collectivizing their claim holdings and centralizing their investment
decisions on the scale and with the degree of coherence required to
blunt the defendant's  classwide  investment advantage.
It might be  supposed  that free-riding could  over  time  produce
more optimal  investment;  the  free-rider  could spend some  of the
"savings"  from  appropriating  others'  work  product  to  build  the
plaintiffs case beyond the point where the original investor's incen-
tives  ran out, where  the  marginal  cost  exceeded  marginal  return.
88.  Defendants  may seek  to undermine  these  arrangements,  for  example,  by creating
freely  accessible  discovery  depositories  to  decrease  the value  of costly cooperation  and  by
making differentiated  settlement offers  that account  for a lawyer's  relative  trial  experience
and  prowess  to heighten  conflict and  competition  among the attorneys.
89.  Arbitrators  increasingly  rely  on  arbitral  precedents-case  records,  orders,  and
awards-in  making their decisions.  See generally  Jeffery P. Commission,  Precedent in Investment
Treaty Arbitration: A  Citation Analysis of a Developing  Jurisprudence,  24J.  INT'L ARm.  129  (2007)
(reviewing the value and precedential role of tribunal cases, awards, and orders in investment
treaty  arbitration);  Gabrielle  Kaufmann-Kohler,  Arbitral  Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?,
23 ARB.  IN'T'L 357, 362-69  (2007)  (analyzing  arbitrators'  incentives to rely on past awards in
international  commercial  arbitration,  sports  arbitration, and  international  investment arbi-
tration).  However,  the motivation  of an  arbitrator to make  a decision  publicly accessible  is
subject to the counter pressure of potential appropriation of this work product by competing
arbitrators.  See William  M.  Landes  & Richard  A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL  STUD.  235,  248-50  (1979).
90.  On  the  effect  of  free-riding  in  deterring  first-mover  investment,  see  Michael
Abramowicz  & John F.  Duffy, Intellectual Property  for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U.  L.  REv.
337,  354-63  (2008).
91.  See Coffee,  supra note 86.
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Because  the free-rider  got a costless head start, one might think it
could  convert those savings into additional investments  that aid the
plaintiffs'  common  question case. Yet free-riding, even  unimpeded
and  costless-never  close  to  the  case  in  reality-will  not lead  to
such  accretive  investments.  If a marginal investment  is not worth-
while  for  the  original  investor  to  make,  it  is  similarly  not
economical for the free-rider, even  though he or she spent nothing
to get to  that same  decision  point.9 2  Free-riding  cannot solve, and
often will exacerbate,  the  Concepcion bias.
To be sure, our proposal entails some  of the same  types of trans-
action  costs  that  exist  when  the  market  provides  individual
representation.  In  particular, class counsel  must expend resources
to  identify  and  notify  class  members  and  then  obtain  agreement
and  cooperation  from  each  in  order to  prosecute  the  arbitration
claims  in  individual  arbitrations.  Plaintiffs  then  must spend  time
and  effort  deciding  to  participate  and supplying  needed  informa-
tion. Class  counsel  will strive  to  cut  these  costs  efficiently,  at least
matching  the  best practices  of the  leading  lawyers  in the  market.
Thus, driven  to maximize  return on investment,  class counsel will,
like  his or her market counterparts,  develop  innovative  means  for
reducing  overhead  through streamlining  and  routinizing contacts
with  plaintiffs.  These  methods  may  include  soliciting  clients  over
the internet, not only through advertisements but also indirectly via
politically  and socially  minded  third-parties  publicizing  the  defen-
dant's alleged wrongdoing  and the need for filing claims to achieve
deterrence  and  compensation.93  By  using  class  counsel,  plaintiffs
will only  incur these  transaction  costs  once, unlike in  the  market,
which magnifies costs by encouraging duplication of effort in hunt-
ing for and managing  large  "inventories" of clients.
92.  This point is one of the most important developed  in Rosenberg  & Spier, supra note
7,  at 21-25.
93.  After  Concepcion, plaintiffs'  attorneys used a website to build an inventory  of roughly
1,000  potential  arbitration  claims  to file  individually against AT&T in an  attempt to block a
proposed  merger.  See  FIGHT AT&T's  TAKEOVER  OF  T-MoBILE,  http://www.fightthemerger.
corn (last visited Mar.  19, 2013);  see also Martha  Neil, After Supreme Court Win Forcing Customers
to Arbitrate, AT&T Now Sues to Stop the Arbitration, A.B.A.J.  (Aug.  17,  2011,  2:03 PM),  http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/after-supreme-court-win-requiring-customers-toarbi-
trateattnowtries.  Although  indicative  of  the  potential  for  soliciting  claims  over  the
internet, the plaintiffs'  arbitration  claims did not suffer from  Concepcion bias, as they involved
a formally centralized cause of action for classwide  injunctive  relief, not individual damages.
Unamused,  AT&T was suddenly less  excited about the prospect of individual arbitration.  See
Complaint for Declaratory  and Injunctive  Relief at 2, AT&T Mobility  LLC v. Gonnello,  No.
11CIV5636,  2011 WL  3565070  (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12,  2011)  ("[Djefendants and the other claim-
ants intend  to 'use AT&T's  own Arbitration  Agreement' against AT'M  by filing  'thousands'
of copycat  consumer  arbitrations  seeking  identical,  classwide  relief:  a  blanket  injunction
prohibiting AT[M from completing  its $39  billion merger with  T-Mobile USA, Inc.").
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The  collective  action  advantages  of  the  class  counsel  solution
should enable  it to address these  transaction  costs  better than  the
claim-aggregation  market, the only alternative remaining after Con-
cepcion. 94  Vast  savings  will  accrue  immediately  because  class
members can  rely on an informed judicial determination  of the at-
torney best qualified  to provide  them with  effective representation
in  their  individual  arbitrations.  Our  proposal  will  also  enhance
plaintiffs'  ability to  secure  representation.  Motivated  by  the  class-
wide stake, class counsel will exploit far greater scale efficiencies  for
more  cost-effective  results than attorneys  in the market could mus-
ter from their respective fractional  stakes. These efficiencies should
94.  Indeed, our proposal  may well prove superior in this regard to class action, which  of
course  Concepcion renders  generally  unavailable  in  arbitration.  See  131  S.  Ct.  1740,  1751
(2011).  Class action does not eliminate  individual representation  and its costs. Thus,  in typi-
cal  class  actions,  class  counsel's  aggregate  fee  is  conditioned  on  ultimately  establishing
liability and damages  for each class member on an individual basis. See generally David  Rosen-
berg, Decoupling  Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future  Loss,
88 VA.  L.  REV.  1871  (2002)  (arguing against using a "unified judgment" to resolve  class ac-
tions and  for  decoupling  classwide  determination  of liability  and damages  for  deterrence
purposes  from  the  distribution  of  the  aggregate  recovery  for  compensation  purposes).
Courts have developed various decoupling methods  for cutting  the costs of individual repre-
sentation in  class actions. These strategies included the use of random sampling, generalized
proof, or formulas to assess aggregate liability and damages. Id. at 1893,  1917-18. Courts also
pursued  "workers compensation"  type  schemes  for  distributing  aggregate  damages  among
class members  (while avoiding deterrence diluting effects)  by invoking cy pres or fluid recov-
ery rules to pay the typically large unclaimed balance  to third parties rather than back to the
defendant.  See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig.,  744 F.2d 1252,  1271  (7th  Cir.  1984).
But these  methods  have  been called  into serious  question  by the  Supreme Court.  See Wal-
Mart Stores,  Inc. v. Dukes, 131  S.  Ct. 2541,  2561  (2011)  ("The Court of Appeals believed that
it was  possible to replace  [individual  district court]  proceedings  with Trial  by Formula....
We disapprove  that novel project.");  see also McLaughlin  v. Am.  Tobacco  Co., 522 F.3d  215,
231-32  (2d  Cir.  2008)  ("When  fluid  recovery  is  used  to  permit  the  mass  aggregation  of
claims,  the right  of defendants  to challenge  the  allegations  of individual  plaintiffs  is  lost,
resulting  in  a due process violation.").
Moreover, Dukes also casts doubt on determining the defendant's  liability and damages in
the aggregate,  deferring questions of individual  causation,  impact, and  damages to a discrete
stage of mini-trials and the like. The Court suggested not only that plaintiffs'  prima facie  case
required a showing of classwide  injury to minimize, if not eliminate, the need for determina-
tions  of individual  harm,  but also  that this  showing  must be  made  at  the pre-certification
stage, all but eliminating the previously well-established,  albeit relatively minor, benefit from
structuring class actions so as to contingently avoid the transactional costs of individual  repre-
sentation in the event the defendant prevails at classwide trial  of the common questions.  See,
e.g., Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550-552  (insisting that courts undertake searching  pre-certification
scrutiny of the  putative  class  members'  individual  circumstances  to  verify  that all  have  suf-
fered  some  injury  due  to  the  defendant's  alleged  wrongdoing  and  thereby  assure  that
common  questions  will  yield common  answers);  see  also In re Hydrogen  Peroxide Antitrust
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311-12  (3d Cir. 2008).  For arguments opposing this trend in decisions as
imposing arbitrary and socially irresponsible constraints on the availability of class action, see
generally Campos, supra note 7; David  Rosenberg,  Collectivising  Private  Enforcement of Antitrust
Law: A  Reform Proposal  for the  United States and Possibly Beyond, 3  GLOBAL  COMPETrION  LMG.
REv.  11  (2010).The Class Counsel Solution
substantially improve solicitation  and communication  among  class
counsel and plaintiffs.
Further,  class  counsel's  contact  with  class  members  will  occur
under the legitimizing aegis and imprimatur of federal court orders
convening the class action and implementing our proposal. Instead
of evaluating and choosing from  among  a confusing  array of com-
peting  attorneys,  class  members  would  hear  the  single, judicially
approved  voice  of class  counsel.  Moreover,  conveying  the  formal
indicia  of judicial  sanction  and  oversight,  these  communications
will  be  imbued  with  attributes  of authority  and  authenticity  that
should encourage plaintiffs to seriously consider responding favora-
bly to class  counsel's  overtures and requests.95
Class counsel in effect possesses an exclusive patent on acquiring
and representing  the  entire class  of claims.  Plaintiffs  thus gain in-
vestment-incentive  parity  without  incurring  the  market's
organizational  costs, including those from free-riding as well  as the
dead weight social  loss from attorneys'  duplicative  efforts. Indeed,
the  principal  organizational  process  entailed  by  our  proposal-
courts  appointing and awarding  fees  to  class counsel-adds  social
benefit at no significant  cost.
III.  CONSISTENCY  WITH  EXISTING  FEDERAL  LAW
Our proposal  can be implemented  immediately  under  existing
federal  law-the  FAA,  as  interpreted  by  Concepcion, and Rule  23.
Affording plaintiffs  the advantages  of class counsel's  ability to mar-
shal  their pooled  legal  resources  against  the  common  defendant
serves the  Rule  23  goal of providing  plaintiffs  with  effective  assis-
tance  of  counsel  and  coheres  with  the  aim  of  the  FAA,  as
interpreted by Concepcion, to allow them  access to the  efficient pro-
cedures  of individual arbitrations.
This conclusion springs from analysis of the terms of these provi-
sions  but  also  from  recognition  of  their  complementary
contributions to the shared end of fostering and enhancing  the le-
gal options of prospective plaintiffs to vindicate their rights. Rule 23
overcomes the collective action barriers that prevent plaintiffs from
95.  Class counsel  should  benefit  from  the  practice in  class  actions generally,  whereby
courts relax ordinary restrictions on attorney solicitations with "non-clients" and affirmatively
facilitate these and other efforts to obtain class members' informed  participation, not only by
reviewing  and  endorsing the solicitations  and other communications  but also by requiring
the defendant  to provide names and contact  information of potential claimants.  To reduce
unnecessary  cost, courts  also permit  a  class  member to "retain"  class counsel  as  his  or her
individual  representative  without filling  out a  lengthy retention  agreement,  but rather  by
simply checking  a box on a form  and supplying any necessary  evidentiary documentation.
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voluntarily joining together to obtain  legal  representation  capable
of negating  the  pro-defendant  Concepcion bias.96 As  such,  Rule  23
provides  plaintiffs with freedom  of choice  (to associate  or not) in
selecting legal counsel to prosecute their common question claims.
Class members  can still opt out, but they also can join together to
take  advantage  of the  recovery-maximizing  power  of centralized,
classwide action. The FAA provides plaintiffs with the additional op-
tion of streamlined  and efficient  individual arbitration procedures,
which,  according  to  Concepcion, operate  most  cost-effectively  in
small claim cases.97 There is no discernible conflict between  the two
regimes. Our proposal advances both the public policies and funda-
mental  constitutional  norms  animating  Rule  23-that  plaintiffs
should  be  free  (or  at  least  as  free  as  defendants)  to  select  and
organize  their  legal  representation  to  vindicate  their  claims  of
right-and the FAA policies promoting the procedural efficiency of
arbitration. 9 8  In  providing  plaintiffs  with  effective  assistance  of
counsel  to  make  their  case,  unconstrained  by the  Concepcion bias
but within the framework  of the individual arbitration process, our
proposal promotes  the basic policies  of the FAA and Rule  23.
A.  FAA  Compatibility
The policy animating the FAA, as the Court in Concepcion empha-
sized, aims  to afford the parties  the option  of having their dispute
resolved  by "efficient, streamlined  [arbitration]  procedures." 99 The
class  counsel solution, as we have shown, complements rather than
conflicts with this objective.  Appointing  class  counsel  to  represent
plaintiffs in their individual arbitrations  is, on its face and in opera-
tion,  fully  consistent  with  any  set of standard  (Concepcion default
rule)  or customized  arbitration  procedures  that the parties would
elect to govern in their individual arbitrations. The FAA extends no
96.  Class action  is  thus designed  to the afford  plaintiffs the benefits of voluntaryjoinder
that  the  market,  as  a practical  matter,  fails  to produce.  Notably, the  first prerequisite  for
certifying any type of class action is that "the class is so numerous thatjoinder  of all members
is impracticable."  FED.  R.  CIv.  P.  23(a)(1).
97.  See AT&T  Mobility LLC  v.  Concepcion,  131  S.  Ct.  1740,  1752  (2011)  (noting that
arbitration is not well suited to large stake claims, let alone  class actions, especially because of
the lack  of the availability of judicial  review).
98.  It  would be  surprising,  to  say  the  least, for  the  Court  to follow  up  Concepcion by
interpreting  the FAA to deny plaintiffs in arbitration the basic prerogative  they have  in every
other domain  of the  legal system  to freely choose their own counsel, whether by class action
or other lawful means.
99.  131  S. Ct. at 1749  ("The point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration
processes  is  to  allow for efficient, streamlined  procedures  tailored to the type  of dispute.").
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preemptive  force to dictate  what  legal representation, if any, plain-
tiffs can  obtain; it does  not override  statutes of a majority of states
that specify that parties have the right to be represented by an attor-
ney  in  arbitration.100   As  arbitration  codes  recognize,  the
opportunity to be represented  by an attorney is a central, defining
attribute  of arbitration  so  important  that  it  may  not  be  waived
before a controversy arises.101 Representation  by counsel is part and
parcel  of the  arbitral  procedures  protected  by  the  FAA.  As  evi-
denced  by its  text and  history  as well  as  its  basic  design,  the FAA
addresses the procedural  structure of the arbitral adjudicative  pro-
cess, 1 0 2  not  the  lawyer  who  appears  for  the  plaintiff,  not  the
professionally  sanctioned  relationship  between  the  lawyer  and
other similarly situated plaintiffs, and surely not the lawyer's  capac-
ity to effectively represent his or her clients'  interest by preventing
the  defendant from  stacking the  procedural  deck against  them in
individual  arbitrations.1
03
To the contrary, the Court has consistently read the FAA as con-
taining  a  basic  requirement  that arbitration  processes  must  not
operate  to  prevent  plaintiffs  from  effectively  making  their  case
under the  governing  substantive  law.  In  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,1 04 the Court held that the FAA endorsed
the arbitration of federal claims, "so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate  [his or her] statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum,"  to  ensure  the  substantive  law would  "continue  to
serve both  its remedial  and deterrent function.'' 0 5 In applying the
FAA, the majority  stressed that, "[b]y agreeing  to arbitrate  a statu-
tory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive  rights afforded by
[a]  statute. '10 6  By  correcting  for a  process  slanted  in  the  defen-
dant's favor, the  proposal directly furthers  this primary purpose.
100.  See,  e.g.,  UNIF.  ARBITRATION  AcT §  16  (2000)  ("A party to an arbitration  proceeding
may be  represented by  a lawyer.").
101.  See id. § 4(b)(4).
102.  See, e.g.,  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler  Chrysler-Plymouth,  Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)  (recognizing  that, in  agreeing  to arbitrate,  a  party only "trades the  procedures  and
opportunity  for  review  of the  courtroom for the simplicity,  informality, and  expedition  of
arbitration").
103.  Without  developing  the point here,  we note  that  Concepcion's reading  of  the FAA
indicates that arbitrators  may exercise  rule-making  discretion  to  adjust the  procedures, in-
cluding by adopting  the class counsel solution,  to correct the Concepcion pro-defendant bias.
104.  473 U.S.  614.
105.  Id. at 637.
106.  Id. at 628;  see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson  Lane Corp.,  500 U.S. 20,  28  (1991)
(affirming  that arbitration  is not merely a means for resolving private grievances, but serves
to  "further  broader  social  purposes" of the substantive  law,  such  as  the ADEA  policies  in-
volved,  a  function  it can  perform  only so  long as  the arbitral procedures  assure that "'the
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The Court has made clear that this fundamental FAA principle  of
supporting underlying  private  rights and public interests protected
by the substantive  law applies  regardless  of whether  the process ei-
ther  by  design  or  unintentionally  precludes  plaintiffs  (and
presumably defendants)  from effectively vindicating their claims  of
right. Thus, in  Green Tree Financial  Corb.-Alabama v. Randolph,1 0 7 the
Court  posited  that  even  neutral  rules  that formally  burden  each
party equally can lack FAA  sanction when, for example, "large arbi-
tration  costs ...  preclude a litigant ...  from  effectively vindicating
her federal statutory rights  in  the arbitral forum.' 08
Most importantly for the present analysis of Concepcion, the Green
Tree Court  indicated  that  to  the  extent  an  arbitration  procedure
prevents  plaintiffs  from  effectively vindicating  their claims,  courts,
state legislatures, and arbitrators may impose a corrective condition
for enforcement of the arbitration agreement so long as the proce-
dural  fix  is  consistent  with  the  nature  and  purposes  of
arbitration. 1 0 9 A good example of such  a corrective  is  the cost-shift-
ing  rule  that  is  a  standard  component  of the  procedural  code
governing consumer arbitrations. ' 0 Thus, had the plaintiff in Green
Tree demonstrated  the  existence  of prohibitive  costs,  the  Court
seemed  prepared  to uphold  the lower  court ruling that effectively
conditioned the arbitration agreement's enforcement on the defen-
dant's  willingness  to  shoulder  costs  that  prevented  plaintiff from
effectively vindicating  the federal  claim  involved."'
Seen  in  this  light,  Concepcion stands  for  the  narrow,  well-estab-
lished proposition that courts, state legislatures, and arbitrators may
not implement a public policy  that imposes a corrective  condition
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate  [his or her]  statutory cause of action in the arbi-
tral forum'"  (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473  U.S.  at 637)).
107.  531  U.S.  79  (2000).
108.  Id. at 90.
109.  SeeAT&T  Mobility LLC v.  Concepcion,  131  S. Ct. 1740,  1748  (2011).
110.  See Am.  ARBITRATION  ASS'N,  CONSUMER  DUE  PROCESS  PROTOCOL  princ. 6, Reporter's
Cmts. (2012),  available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/codes  ("The consensus of the
Committee  was that if participation  in mediation  is mandated  by the ADR  agreement, the
Provider should pay the costs of the procedure, including mediator's fees and expenses.");  see
also Green Tree, 531 U.S.  at 95  & n.2  (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111.  531  U.S.  at 90-91  & n.6.  Green Tree found the  risk of such costs "too speculative  to
justify  the  invalidation  of an arbitration  agreement,"  noting in particular  that the standard
cost-shifting procedure  in consumer arbitrations might well apply  to solve the preclusive-cost
problem  in the  plaintiff's  case.  Id. Without  offending  the FAA,  recent courts  have  found
unconscionable  arbitration agreements that included prohibitive  cost-shifting arrangements.
See, e.g., Barras v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig. MDL
No.  2036),  685  F.3d  1269,  1276-82  (11th  Cir. 2012);  Hall  v. Treasure  Bay Virgin  Islands
Corp.,  371  F. App'x 311,  313-14  (3d  Cir. 2010).
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on enforcement  of an arbitration  agreement if the corrective  con-
flicts  with  the  essential  attribute  of the  arbitration  process  as  an
efficient mode of dispute resolution. 11 2  In  Concepcion, the Court did
not question  California's  public policy  objective  of assuring access
to  court or arbitration  for consumers  with  claims for small losses
arising from  the  terms of adhesive  contracts. 13 The Court instead
rejected  the  corrective  condition  for  enforcing  arbitration  agree-
ments-class arbitration-as preempted  by  the FAA.  It  concluded
that "the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the prin-
cipal  advantage  of  arbitration-its  informality-and  makes  the
process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural
morass than final judgment."114 But the Court was most concerned
that defendants would be discouraged from agreeing to arbitration
in the first place if they faced the prospect of class arbitration with
its "'in  terrorem'  settlement[ ]" pressures  of classwide  trial." 5
The class  counsel solution poses no such risk; indeed, as we  have
shown,  it will further  the  objective  of arbitration  by  providing  an
efficient, streamlined process for plaintiffs and defendants  to effec-
tively  vindicate  their  common  question  claims  and  defenses.
Unconstrained by the Concepcion bias, class counsel will be able and
motivated to make  a stronger case  on the common  questions than
would a lawyer proceeding independently-in  reality  an absolutely
stronger case because there would be  no case under the Concepcion
bias-and  class  counsel  will  do  so  within the agreed upon or default
procedures for the individual arbitration.  Like  all  plaintiffs'  attorneys,
class counsel  must abide by the governing  procedures.
The class counsel proposal preserves  the process of individual ar-
bitrations  mandated  (in the  absence  of express  agreement by  the
parties  or congressional  directive  to  the  contrary)  by  Concepcion.
Class  counsel  eliminates  Concepcion's pro-defendant  bias,  enabling
plaintiffs  to  effectively  vindicate  their claims  in individual  arbitra-
tions, which  may  take  place  exactly  as  specified  in  the  arbitration
agreement. Because  the proposal  solves the problem of pro-defen-
dant  bias  without  adversely  affecting  the  arbitration  process,  it
provides  a  consistent,  and  needed,  complement  to  Concepcion's
mandate for individual arbitrations.
112.  See Concepcion, 131  S.  Ct. at 1751.
113.  See id. at 1746.
114.  Id. at  1751.
115.  Id. at  1752.
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B.  Rule 23 Compatibility
Non-mandatory class  action principally aims to remedy collective
action  problems  and market failures  that prevent numerous  plain-
tiffs  from  voluntarily  aggregating  their  individual  stakes  into  a
collective  classwide  stake  that  will  motivate  their  attorney  (class
counsel)  to invest optimally in making the best case against the de-
fendant  on  common  questions. 116  By  doing  so,  class  action
eliminates  the  pro-defendant  bias  that arises  when  an  individual
plaintiff with investment incentives limited to  the personal stake in
the outcome of his or her claim is pitted against the defendant with
investment  incentives  in the  classwide  outcome of all claims.  Even
though the class counsel solution does not authorize classwide  trial,
by promoting voluntary joinder it brings the  same bias-busting  ef-
fects  to  individual  arbitrations.  Despite  the  lack of classwide  trial,
Rule  23(b) (3)  accommodates  and  can  be  used  to effectuate  our
proposal.
Nothing in the Rule's requirements precludes courts from imple-
menting  our  solution  to  Concepcion's bias  by  certifying  a  class  of
arbitration  claimants  to  appoint  class  counsel  who  will  represent
class  members  in  their  respective  individual  arbitration  trials.  In
particular,  the Rule  does  not, by its  purposes  or terms,  either  ex-
pressly or implicitly, stand against appointment of class counsel  to
represent class members in their individual arbitrations rather than
in a classwide judicial or arbitral trial.' 17 Quite  to the contrary,  the
policy "at the very core of"118 Rule 23 seeks to enable "vindication of
'the rights  of groups of people who  individually would be  without
effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all""' 9 "'by
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something
worth someone's  (usually an attorney's)  labor.'"12 0  The crucial role
of Rule 23(b) (3),  as the Court in Amchem explained, is vesting class
counsel  with  the  classwide  stake  and  corresponding  investment
incentives.'
2'
116.  See supra Part I.B.
117.  Nor does Rule  23(b) (3)  restrict class  counsel to representing  class members  in fed-
eral  court as opposed  to litigating  their common  question  claims  in some  other forum,  for
example  as when  the federal  court certifies certain questions for determination  by a state  or
administrative  agency on grounds  such as abstention,  exhaustion, or deferential comity.
118.  Amchem  Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,  617  (1997)  (quoting Mace v. Van  Ru
Credit  Corp.,  109 F.3d 338, 344  (7th  Cir.  1997)).
119.  Id. (quoting Benjamin Kaplan,  A  Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS.  & COM.  L.  REv.  497,
497 (1969)).
120.  Id. (quoting Mace, 109 F.3d  at 344).
121.  See id.; see also Campos,  supra note 7,  at 773-74.
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Appropriately,  the  Court did not suggest any need for classwide
trial to  accomplish  this purpose.122  Indeed,  Amchem held that Rule
23  does  not  even require  that  class  certification  be  intended  for
trial  at  all-classwide,  judicial,  or  otherwise. 123  To  be  sure,  the
Court focused  on  classing claims for small recoveries-without  ex-
cluding cases with higher stakes from the Rule's purview-but these
are  precisely  the  type of claim  for which  the  Court in  Concepcion
mandated individual  arbitrations. 24
Amid atmospheric hostility to class action, the Court's reaction to
the risk of "in terrorem" settlement pressures has placed  the tradi-
tional Rule 23 class action in a precarious position. 25 Reading Rule
23 to authorize appointment of class counsel  to conduct individual
trials in court, or, as  we  propose,  in  arbitration, could  perpetuate
the purpose of the traditional class action; assigning class counsel to
try class  members'  claims  in individual  trials  preserves  the consoli-
dating  savings  of Rule  23  without  any  "in  terrorem"  settlement
danger. And it achieves  the class action's central purpose of afford-
ing plaintiffs'  freedom  of choice  and  association  in  selecting  and
122.  See id. at 617-18.
123.  Id. at  618-21  (finding  nothing in  the Rule  mentioning certification  of settlement-
only class actions in which  the parties disavow all  trials, but observing that nonetheless  this
"has become  a stock device"  and deciding to  follow "all Federal  Circuits  [in]  recogniz[ing]
the utility of Rule 23(b) (3)  settlement classes").  Rule 23's silence on questions of trial organi-
zation  and  management,  rather  than  implying  a  restrictive  reading,  has  been  taken  to
encourage judicial  innovation and  experimentation  pursuant  to the broad  grant of discre-
tion in Rule 23(d) authorizing  trial judges  to "issue orders  that ...  determine  the course of
proceedings." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(d)(1). Thus, despite the lack of express authorization, courts
employ sampling, both random and non-random. See, e.g., Barnes v. District of Columbia,  278
F.R.D. 14,  20  (D.D.C. 2011)  (applying non-random  sampling of class members to  determine
general  damages,  with  both  sides  selecting  up  to  fifteen  class  members);  In re  Estate  of
Marcos  Human  Rights  Litig.,  910  F. Supp.  1460,  1469  (D.  Haw.  1995)  (applying  random
sampling since  there  are no due  process concerns  and this will  create  lower costs  than indi-
vidual trials for all  class members),  affd sub nim. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767  (9th
Cir. 1996). And it says nothing about class litigation proceeding through  mini-trials, another
innovation applied  by some courts. See,  e.g., Jenkins  v. Raymark  Indus., Inc.,  109 F.R.D.  269,
282  (E.D.  Tex.  1985)  ("If the Class  Representatives  are  successful  in establishing  that  any
asbestos-containing products were  defective, then the members of the class may return to the
particular  division  and  the  District Judge  to  which  each  underlying  suit was  originally  as-
signed for  consolidated mini-trials of four to  ten plaintiffs  on the issues  of exposure  to any
products previously found  to be defective; any damages legally caused by such  exposure; and
any comparative  fault of each plaintiff in incurring such damages."),  affd, 782 F.2d 468  (5th
Cir. 1986).
124.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,  131  S. Ct. 1740, 1752  (2011)  (explaining that
arbitration  is ill suited for  cases involving high  stakes).
125.  Emblematic of the not-unjustified mood among Concepcion Court watchers  was Brian
T. Fitzpatrick, Supreme Court Case Could End Class-Action Suits, S.F. CHRON.  (Nov. 7, 2010,  4:00
AM),  available  at  http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Supreme-Court-case-could-end-
class-action-suits-3246898.php  (arguing prior to  Concepcion that a wrong decision  by the  Court
will end class actions, since companies will  always include arbitration clauses with class action
waivers in transactional  agreements).
1195University of Michigan  Journal  of Law Reform
organizing  their  legal representation  through  counsel  vested with
the  classwide  stake needed to  overcome  the  Concepcion bias.
CONCLUSION
Appointing  class  counsel  to  represent  common  question  plain-
tiffs  in individual arbitrations  efficiently and effectively negates  the
Concepcion structural bias that would otherwise  skew individual arbi-
tration  outcomes  in  favor  of a common  defendant. Our proposal
changes  only one feature of the current legal landscape:  it enables
plaintiffs to marshal a classwide investment in developing their best
case on the common questions to counter the classwide  investment
that  the  defendant  would  otherwise  make,  one-sidedly  and  over-
whelmingly,  against  each  plaintiff.  The  class  counsel  solution  to
Concepcion's bias  is  thus fully compatible  with the FAA and its man-
date for individual  arbitrations. In compliance with  Concepcion, the
class  counsel  solution  does  not  entail  class  arbitration  or  any
changes  in  the  individual  arbitration  process  that would  conflict
with  its  essential  mission  of providing  contracting  parties with  an
efficient,  streamlined  procedural  scheme  for  resolving  their  dis-
putes. Our proposal also  coheres with  Rule  23(b) (3)  (and its state
analogs). 126  Designed  to  provide  class members  with class  counsel
representation  in  their individual  arbitrations,  the  proposal  trun-
cates  the  process  for  certifying  class  actions,  requiring  only  that
courts  decide  on the  candidate  for  class  counsel best qualified  to
marshal  the  classwide  investment  to  maximize  recovery  by  class
members  in their individual arbitrations.
Our  proposal  is  no  panacea.  The  class  counsel  solution  elimi-
nates  the  Concepcion bias,  but because  it achieves  this  result  in  a
manner  consistent with  the mandate  for individual  arbitrations,  it
cannot  avoid  transactional  litigation  costs  endemic  to  individual
representation.  Thus,  class  counsel  and  class  members  alike  will
bear costs  related  to  initiating  and prosecuting  common  question
claims  on an individual  basis.  In particular,  class counsel  must ex-
pend  resources  to  identify,  enlist  cooperation  from,  and  obtain
126.  Though the proposal  wholly conforms to the existing Federal Rules,  an amendment
could  ensure consistent implementation  across the nation's federal courts. The judicial Con-
ference  of the United  States  could  suggest  amending  the  Rules  to  provide  explicitly  that
federal courts could certify a class in order to appoint class counsel that would represent class
members  in individual court or arbitration  trials.  See 28  U.S.C.  § 331  (2006).  However,  this
route  to  reform  may run into roadblocks  erected  by the Rules  Enabling Act.  See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072  (2006).  Congress could legislate alternative  methods of providing such  class  counsel
representation  for judicial  and arbitration  resolution of common  question  litigation. States
might revise rules  to  allow a similar solution  in state proceedings.
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relevant  documents  and  other  information  (e.g.,  sales  receipts)
from  each  plaintiff, while  the  class member  must spend  time and
energy to  make informed  decisions and comply  with  counsel's  re-
quests. 27 How  great  these  transaction  costs will  be  for any  given
case  is hard to say. The market, however, is not a practical  alterna-
tive.  As  we  have  shown, it will fail to  solve  the  Concepcion bias and
generally  will operate  at considerably  greater cost than  would our
proposal. Yet, when, as in Concepcion, many thousands of widely dis-
persed plaintiffs present claims for small amounts of individual loss,
these  transactional  litigation  costs  can  severely  limit  and  even
thwart  class  counsel's  efforts  to  aggregate  the  plaintiff-side  stake,
thereby handing the defendant a  largely unmitigated  classwide  in-
vestment advantage  to vanquish plaintiffs  at trial and deter lawyers
from applying for  the post of class  counsel.
Even  in  the absence  of its pro-defendant  biasing  effects,  Concep-
cion nonetheless works a socially problematic  transformation  of the
system for private  enforcement  of the  law. It continues a trend in
the Court's recent rulings, which have vastly expanded the scope of
FAA  preemption 12 8  and  greatly  narrowed  the  availability  of both
class actions129 and civil  liability more  generally.13 0  It is difficult to
credit the  ostensible  rationale  of these  lines of decision  as  simply
aimed  at reducing  the procedural  costs  of civil  litigation.  No  one
could  reasonably believe that such  saving may be garnered, for ex-
ample,  by  resolving  the  small  sum  claims  in  Concepcion through
thousands  or tens  of thousands  of individual  arbitration  hearings
involving redundant  production requests  and  depositions and  the
duplicative  efforts  of different  lawyers,  experts,  and  arbitrators.
Rather, this fantastical vision of the individual arbitration process  in
action strongly suggests that the purpose of the Court's rulings is to
achieve  what they will  do in  fact:  throttle  common question  litiga-
tion across the board, and, in particular, render small sum common
question  claims-arising from  adhesion  contracts and  the like  be-
tween  individuals  and  business,  government,  and  other
institutions-a virtual nullity.
127.  Cf  Concepcion, 131  S.  Ct. at  1761  (2011)  (Breyer, J.,  dissenting)  ("In  California's
perfectly rational  view, nonclass arbitration over such  [small]  sums will also sometimes  have
the effect of depriving  claimants of their claims  (say, for example, where claiming the $30.22
were to involve filling  out many  forms that require  technical legal  knowledge  or waiting at
great length while  a  call is placed  on  hold).").
128.  See, e.g.,  Preston v. Ferrer,  552 U.S.  346, 353, 356  (2008).
129.  See Amchem  Prods.,  Inc.  v.  Windsor,  521  U.S.  591,  625  (1997);  see also Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.  v. Dukes,  131  S.  Ct.  2541,  2561  (2011).
130.  See Ashcroft  v. Iqbal,  556 U.S.  662, 678-81  (2009);  Bell At.  Corp.  v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570  (2007).
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The Court's motivation appears  to stem in part from  the feeling
that plaintiffs  (read:  plaintiffs'  attorneys)  are  abusing  the  system,
especially by threatening  defendants  with  the "in  terrorem" settle-
ment pressures of classwide  trial. 13 1 This danger is asserted without
substantiating  evidence, but it is also misrepresented  analytically as
affecting only defendants.  Defendants  may well be  sufficiently risk-
averse  to settle  for more  than  the  expected  recovery  value  of the
classed claims to avoid  the prospect  of liability and damages  being
determined-in part-by a single  classwide  trial judgment  on  the
common  questions.  But  plaintiffs  may  likewise  be  sufficiently  risk-
averse  to  settle for  less  than  the  expected  recovery value  of their
classed claims rather than face the prospect of liability and damages
being  determined-in full-by such  a  single  classwide  trial judg-
ment. Contrary to the Court's one-sided  depiction  of the problem,
classwide  trial  poses  no  systematic  "in  terrorem" settlement effect;
both parties are likely to be subject to such pressure, with the party
most  burdened  by  risk-bearing  cost  paying  a  premium  price  to
avoid  classwide  trial.132  Notably,  our  solution  coheres  completely
with the  Concepcion Court's policy motivations  for reading the FAA
to mandate individual arbitrations because class certification for the
purpose of appointing class  counsel to  represent class members in
individual arbitrations immediately and entirely eliminates both the
bias and  "in terrorem" settlement pressures.133
131.  The  Court also  resorts  to  bumper-sticker  superficialities,  such  as  the  assertion  in
Concepcion that  class arbitration  will interfere  with the broader  individual arbitration  system
because  "there is  little  incentive for  lawyers  to arbitrate  on behalf of individuals when  they
may do so for a  class and reap far higher fees in  the process."  131  S.  Ct. at 1750.  Nonsense.
Lawyers are rational  profit  maximizers;  they seek  the highest  net, not gross, return  on their
investment. The fee in an individual case will  surely be less than the fee in a class action. This
is so not simply because a  10 percent fee on a $100  award in a single case will be less than a
10  percent  fee  on  a  $100,000  award  in  a  class  action  comprising  1,000  such  claims.  More
fundamentally, as we have emphasized, the class action fee will be greater because with  1,000
times more at stake than  the plaintiff's lawyer  in the individual  case, class counsel will  have
the  incentive  to  make  a  classwide  investment to obtain  a  classwide recovery, both of which
will  be greater  in whole  than  the  sum  of the  parts.  But, of course,  the  lawyer's  choice  to
devote  a  given amount  of resources  to  the  class  action  or to  a series of individual  actions
turns on a net-benefit comparison of relative  litigation costs and risks of the alternatives  and
their consequent expected return. In short, no lawyer will  make massive  investments of time
and  money  in  a  risky class  action  if the  expected  hourly return  from  the  individual  case
alternative  exceeds that expected  from  the class action.
132.  See Hay  & Rosenberg,  supra  note  7,  at  1402-04.
133.  Some  commentators  in search  of alternatives  to  class arbitration  that provide  ade-
quate  deterrence  and  compensation  have  posited  an  expansion  of state  attorney  general
parens patriae powers  to prosecute judicial  class actions or functionally equivalent actions for
collective redress of common question  small-loss claims.  See e.g.,  Myriam  Gilles & Gary Fried-
man, After Class: Aggregate Litigation  in the Wake ofAT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,  79 U. CHI.  L.
Rav. 623, 675  (2012)  ("Parens patriae litigation  mayjust be poised for a qualitatively new roleThe Class Counsel Solution
Concepcion may  also  be  read  as  responding  to  concerns  about
overuse  of the civil  liability system. Although  the Court again one-
sidedly misrepresents the problem as caused  by plaintiffs, 34  there is
good  reason  to  believe  that  litigants'  private  interests  will  drive
them  to  rationally  and  in  good  faith  spend  more  in suing  each
other than  the litigation  is worth  to society in  terms of deterrence
and other benefits. 35 But one may be skeptical  that the  Court pos-
sesses  the  information  or  the  perspective  needed  to  accurately
assess  and  effectively  curtail  such  overuse  of  the  system.  In  any
event, it would be absurd for the Court to argue that its decision in
Concepcion moves  in  the  right direction  by leaving  the  choice  be-
tween  class  and  individual  arbitration  to  contract  between  the
prospective litigants. Contract between  even the most sophisticated
private  parties will  generally capture  too  little  of the  social benefit
to  optimally  produce  public  goods such  as deterrence.
13 6 And, by
the Court's own admission,  Concepcion's individual  arbitration man-
date  targets  precisely  the  Concepcion-type  case:  numerous
consumers, employees,  or similar non-commercial  individual plain-
tiffs suing on claims arising from adhesion contracts  involving small
losses. These cases do not involve pre-dispute  contracts between  so-
phisticated  repeat-players.  Doubtless,  the  prospective  plaintiffs
"agreed"  to  no-class  arbitration  clauses  in  such  cases  not  merely
without  reading  them, but without  having  the  means  or  even  an
in the enforcement  landscape.").  But such suits cannot eliminate the defendant's  biased in-
vestment advantage  in common  question  litigations involving  alleged wrongdoing spanning
multiple  states.  Nor  can  such  suits  address  the  Court's  concerns  about  the  "in  terrorem"
settlement pressures of classwide  trial judgments on defendants; indeed, they only reproduce
them.  Moreover, state  attorney general actions would  be  subject to myriad public-choice  en-
cumbrances,  such  as  government  resource  constraints,  slack  performance  by  salaried  state
employees,  agency imperialism,  political conflicts  of interest between state  agencies, and the
danger  of state agent capture by or of regulated  parties.  See FRED  S.  MCCHESNEY,  MONEY  FOR
NOTHING:  POITIctANs,  RENT  EXTRAC11ON,  AND  POLITnCAL  ExToRTION  (1997);  Daryl J.  Levin-
son,  Empire-Building Government in Constitutional  Law, 118  HARv.  L.  REv.  915  (2005);  see also
Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative  Suits by State  Attorneys General,
126  HARv.  L.  REV.  486,  487  (2012)  ("[F]ar from  solving  the problems  that scholars  have
emphasized in the class action context,  the fact that the attorney general may be an  elected
official should provide cause  for heightened  concern.").
134.  This  may explain  Iqba4 556  U.S.  662,  in which  there  was  little prospect  that the
government  would settle weak  claims.
135.  See generally Steven Shavell,  The Fundamental  Divergence Between the Private  and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26J. LEGAL STUD.  575 (1997)  (discussing the disconnect between
the incentives and costs  of litigation for private parties  and society).
136.  We  are  not questioning  the  potential  social utility  of pre-dispute  arbitration  con-
tracts  between commercial  parties.  See Bruce L.  Hay, Christopher  Rendall-Jackson  & David
Rosenberg,  Litigating BP's Contribution Claims in Publicly Subsidized Courts: Should Contracting
Parties  Pay Their Own  Way?, 64 VAND.  L.  REv. 1919  (2011)  (noting that eliminating  the public
subsidy for using courts would lead commercial  parties to optimally choose between judicial
and arbitral resolution  of their contract  disputes).
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economically rational reason to devote time to divining their signifi-
cance. Prospective  institutional defendants may well know whether
exposing themselves to class or individual arbitration  promotes the
joint private  (not public)  interests of the contracting parties in min-
imizing  the  sum  of  accident  costs.  But  given  that  this  choice
determines  whether they can exploit the  Concepcion  bias and other-
wise  shield  themselves  from  liability  for  wrongdoing,  it  surely  is
capricious  for  the  Court to  decide  (based  on  the  attribution  of a
perverse  intention to Congress)  that such deeply conflicted  parties
should have  the final  say over their own  legal  accountability.
For  all of its  faults,  Concepcion worked  its most serious  harm  by
buttressing  a pro-defendant  bias  that undermines  enforcement  of
the vast network  of constitutional,  statutory, and common law  pro-
tections designed to promote deterrence,  compensation, and other
social welfare enhancing policies. As such,  Concepcion broke  a cardi-
nal  rule  supported  by  longstanding  precedent:  agreements  to
arbitrate  future  claims  shall not undermine  the  law's  social  objec-
tives  by forcing a party to forgo  effective enforcement of his or her
substantive claims of right. 1 37 The socially detrimental repercussions
will reverberate  through the legal relationships that define contem-
porary  American  life,  including  those  between  individuals  and  a
host of social  goods suppliers  like  manufacturers,  retailers, banks,
employers,  healthcare  providers, and government agencies.
38  For
137.  See  Mitsubishi  Motors  Corp.  v.  Soler  Chrysler-Plymouth,  Inc.,  473  U.S.  614,  628
(1985).  The Supreme Court may further  elucidate  the "effective vindication"  doctrine this
Term.  See Am. Express Co. v. Italian  Colors Rest., No. 12-133  (argued Feb.  27,  2013); see also
David Korn  & David  Rosenberg,  Cruises, Class Actions, and the Court, 2  U.  MICH. J.L. REFORM
ONLINE  96, 98  (2013)  (considering  the case).
138.  Recent  cases indicate  that the  potential  impact of the  Concepcion bias  reaches  well
beyond  the cell phone contracts involved in AT&T Mobility LLC v.  Concepcion, 131  S.  Ct. 1740
(2011). For cases dealing with contractual claims against cell phone and Internet companies,
see  Cruz v.  Cingular  Wireless, LLC, 648  F.3d  1205  (11th  Cir.  2011);  Pendergrast  v.  Sprint Nextel
Corp.,  592 F.3d  1119  (1lth Cir. 2010); and Chalk v.  T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087  (9th Cir.
2009).  For cases alleging antitrust violations, see  Stolt-Nielsen S.A.  v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp.,  130  S. Ct. 1758  (2010)  (oceanic shipper)  and Italian Colors Restaurant v. American Ex-
press Company (In re Am.  Express Merchs'.  Litig.),  554 F.3d 300  (2d  Cir. 2009)  cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 130  S.  Ct. 2401  (2010)  (credit card company).  For cases dealing with  mar-
keting deceptions  and fraud in the sale of products, see Reed v. Florida  Metropolitan University,
Inc.,  681  F.3d 630  (5th Cir.  2012)  (for-profit  college);  Mance v.  Mercedes-Benz USA,  No.  CV
11-03717  LB,  2012 WL  4497369  (N.D.  Cal.  Sept. 28,  2012)  (car manufacturer);  Fromer v.
Comcast Corp., 886 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Conn. 2012)  (cable television provider); and Graham v.
Progressive  Direct Insurance Co.,  271  F.R.D.  112  (W.D. Pa.  2010)  (insurer).  For cases  dealing
with fraud  and  deception  in financial  and other services,  see  Buckeye  Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna,  546 U.S. 440  (2006)  (short-term lender); Green Tree Financial  Corp.-Alabama  v. Ran-
dolph, 531  U.S.  79  (2000)  (mobile  home financier).  And for cases dealing with  employment
discrimination, seeJock v. SterlingJewelers,  Inc., 646 F.3d  113 (2d Cir. 2011)  (jewelry retailers);
Davis v.  Nordstrom, Inc., No.  C  11-3956  CW,  2012  WL  4478297  (N.D.  Cal.  Sept.  27,  2012)
(department store);  DAntuono v.  Service Road Corp., 789  F. Supp.  2d  308  (D.  Conn.  2011)The Class Counsel Solution
many now and for more to come, the  Concepcion bias will hit home.
Short of reversing the course set by Concepcion, the appointment of
class counsel  for individual  arbitrations could  prevent massive fail-
ure  of the  legal  system  to  adequately  enforce  federal  and  state
substantive  laws.
(adult  entertainment  clubs);  Chen-Oster v.  Goldman,  Sachs  &  Co.,  785  F.  Supp.  2d  394
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)  (investment bank);  Truly Nolen  of America v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d
432  (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)  (pest control company);  and  Wherry v. Award, Inc.,  123 Cal. Rptr. 3d
1 (Cal.  Ct. App. 2011)  (real estate  brokers).
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